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Ethan Klingsberg*

Contextualizing the Calculus of
Consent: Judicial Review of Legislative
Wealth Transfers in a Transition to
Democracy and Beyond'
[I]s movement toward equality institutionally feasible? It is ironic that
despite the extensive literature on distributional policy, this basic question
is almost never posed, let alone answered. The virtue of the constitutional
perspective is that it places this question firmly at center stage. It does so by
shifting the domain of normative inquiry from the set of imaginable income
institutional arrangements from which
distributions to the set of feasible
2
income distributions will emerge.

Introduction
"For a modem judge, one of the worst insults is that she is reenacting the
sin originally committed by the pre-New Deal Court in cases like Lochner v.
New York." 3 While most contemporary commentators would agree with this
sentiment, one legacy of the United States Supreme Court's abandonment
of Lochner style judicial review still evokes controversy: the facilitation of
4
special interest politics.
* Attorney, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, New York.
1. The paper, which grew into this Article, was originally delivered at the
University of Chicago's Center for the Study of Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe's
Conference on Restitution, held at the Central European University on June 17-19,
1993. Stephen Holmes, Larry Lessig, Ellen Comisso, Peter Paczolay, Shlomo Avineri,
Claus Offe, Dwight Semler, and Ulrich Preuss were among the numerous attending
scholars who offered useful comments. In addition, I benefited from comments on the
enlarged manuscript from Krisztina Morvai, Ellen Comisso, and Stephen Holmes. I am
grateful for the University of Chicago Center's intellectual support of this type of
research and analysis of important developments in Eastern Europe that have
widespread theoretical ramifications. I am also grateful for the Soros Foundation's
global funding of law reform initiatives, involvement in which enabled me to have
access to much of the historically significant, first-hand information related in this
Article.
2. GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BucHANAN, THE REASON OF RuLES: CONSTrrUTioNAL PouticAL ECONOMY 117 (1985) (emphasis in original).
3. 1 BRucE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDArIONs 40 (1991).

4. For a bibliography of historical analyses that consider the primary function of
Lochner era constitutionalism as "combatting special privilege, i.e. instances when a legislature displayed favoritism or unreasonably rewarded one constituency at the expense
of another," see Herbert Hovencamp, The PoliticalEconomy of Substantive Due Process, 40
27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 303 (1994)
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During the Lochner era, 5 the judiciary stunted special interest politics
by strictly scrutinizing legislative wealth transfers 6 to particular classes. 7
The Supreme Court struck down legislation intended to benefit the economic positions of bakers, 8 women laborers, 9 construction workers, 10 theater ticket buyers,"' established ice companies,' 2 and gasoline
consumers,' 3 among others. The rationale for these decisions, reached
under the due process clause, echoed Thomas Cooley's constitutional philosophy that legislatures lack authority to pass laws intended "purely for
the promotion of private interests" rather than "the general welfare," 14 or
as Cooley's contemporary heir, the self-described "constitutional political
economist" James M. Buchanan would put it, "genuine 'publicness. ' ''" 5
Since the West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parish'6 decision ushered in the New
STAN. L. REv. 379, 392 & n.68 (1988). Much of the special interest legislation struck

down during the Lochner era was not the product of pressure group politics as we know
it today, rather such legislation was then the product of paternalistic impulses on the
part of the legislature. Id at 416-18.
5. This era lasted roughly from 1905 through 1937.
6. The term "legislative wealth transfer" signifies a government decision to grant a
special benefit to a particular interest group. A wealth transfer need not take the form
of an explicit entitlement to a sum of money; the effect need only be to facilitate or to
subsidize a particular class in connection with economic related matters. The term
derives from the economic literature that models legislatures as firms supplying benefits
(wealth transfers) to competing interest groups in the form of legislation. See, e.g., ROB.
ERT E. McCoRMICK & ROBERT D. ToLUSON, POLITICIANS, LEGISLATION, AND THE EcoN.
OMY. AN INQUIRY INTO THE INTEREST-GRouP THEORY OF GOVERNMENT (1981).

7. Strict scrutiny did not mean that all legislation that supported a particular
group was invalidated by the Lochner era courts. Many laws aimed at special interests
were upheld when the record indicated sufficient externalities to consider the legislature's objective to have been in the public interest. See Hovencamp, supra note 4, at
443-44 (explaining the Court's upholding of special benefits for women in Muller v.
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding limit on working hours for women) as based
upon finding of externalities, rather than finding that women had special needs).
8. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905) (striking down "labor law"
intended to benefit bakers because "interest of the public" would not be "in the slightest degree affected").
9. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 559 (1925) (striking down minimum
wage laws for women as "naked, arbitrary exercise" of legislative authority); see also
Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (same).
10. Conally v. General Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 385 (1926) (striking down minimum
wage laws for construction workers).
11. Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927) (invalidating regulation of theater
ticket resale prices).
12. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
13. Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929) (invalidating gasoline price
regulation).
14. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 1227-28 n.2
(8th ed. 1927).
15. JAMES M. BUCHANAN, ExPLORATIONS INTO CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS

310

(1989) (describing "genuine 'publicness'" as state action that either (1) protects property rights or (2) enforces contracts or (3) "provide[s] ... those goods and services that
are inherently nonrival in consumption and that are not amenable to efficient means of
exclusion" and that are "available on equal-access terms to all persons").

16. 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (determining, after much discussion of "relatively weak"
position of women, that minimum wage law for women is "in the interests of the com-
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Deal era by upholding a minimum wage law for women, the Supreme
Court has changed its stance on legislative wealth transfers. The Court
now routinely dismisses claims that legislation unconstitutionally offers
benefits to only a special interest.17 Today, "general welfare" is such a
to
broad concept that even the flimsiest of "rational objectives" is sufficient
18
fend off a constitutional challenge to a legislative wealth transfer.
To this day, however, many law and economics scholars condemn the
9
constitutional espousal of special interest politics as an irrational move.'
munity"). However, West Coast Hotel was arguably in the Lochner tradition of upholding
special interest legislation when sufficient externalities existed to show that the legislation was in fact "public regarding." See supra note 7.
17. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983)
(upholding constitutionality of government decision to subsidize veterans groups'
speech and to deny other private groups same treatment); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S.
55 (1982) (Brennan,J., concurring) (Constitution permits legislation intended to benefit particular class with "special need").
18. See Dandridge v. Williams, 387 U.S. 471, 520 (1970) (Murshall, J., dissenting)
(arguing that "the extremes to which the Court has gone in dreaming up rational bases
for state regulation" in the post-Lochner era has gone too far); see also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) ("A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any
state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.").
However, such deference is not always uniform with respect to judicial review of legislative justifications for discrimination that infringes upon economic rights. Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for the majority, recently struck down an Oregon ordinance for
failing to "'regulate[ ] evenhandedly'" the waste disposal industry. Oregon Waste Sys.,
Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 62 U.S.L.W. 4209, 4211 (U.S. Apr. 5, 1994) (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (finding Commerce Clause violation)). In dissent, ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustice Blackmun, the Court's two most
senior justices, reflected post-Lochner deference to the asserted legislative justification
'and expressed dismay that the majority would leave behind case law from the early
1980s in favor of a "myopic focus on 'differential fees.'" Oregon Waste Systems, 62
U.S.L.W. at 4214 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (finding legislative justification legitimate
and rejecting majority's "crank[ing of] the dormant Commerce Clause ratchet... [to]
tie[ ] the hands of the States in addressing the vexing national problem of solid waste
disposal"). A few weeks later, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun joined
again, along with Justice Souter, to lambast the majority for yet another decision striking down a local ordinance as an unconstitutional discrimination against economic
rights. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 62 U.S.L.W. 4315, 4323-29 (Souter, J., dissenting) (May 17, 1994). In C & A Carbon4 the dissenters resorted to the ultimate
weapon: quoting fromJustice Holmes' Lochnerdissent. Id. at 4327 (quoting Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
19.

See, e.g., BERNARD H. SiEGAN, ECONOMic LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 265-

303 (1980); Richard Epstein, Taxation, Regulation, and Confiscation, 20 OscOODE HALL
LJ. 433 (1982); Richard A. Epstein, Modern Republicanism-Orthe Flightfrom Substance,
97 YALE LJ. 1633, 1641 (1988) (describing how upholding legislative wealth transfers
"leads to a greater dissipation of private and social wealth" and "is the description of
[the] disease, not of a healthy political society") (citing Anne 0. Krueger, The Political
Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. Rxv. 291 (1974)); Christopher T. Wonnell, Economic Due Process and the Preservationof Competition, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 91
(1983); see also Michael Conant, Antimonopoly Tradition Under the Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendments: Slaughter-HouseCases Re-Examined, 31 EMORY LJ. 785 (1982).
More moderate voices for a greater role for judicial review of special interest legislation include Erwin Chemerinksy, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword: The Vanishing
Constitution, 103 HA-v. L. Rv. 43, 4647, 78, 80-81 (1989); Jerry L. Mashaw, ConstitutionalDeregulation:Notes Toward a Public, PublicLaw, 54 TUL. L. REv. 849, 874-75 (1980);
Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understandingof Public Law, 65 CHI.-
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They argue that special interest transfers enable well-organized minority
factions to allocate goods inefficiently and selfishly, to the detriment of the
diffuse and unorganized majority and ultimately the entire society. 20 Such
arguments address not only efficiency concerns, but also send a message
that interest groups "undermin[e] democracy" and the sacred will of the
21
people.
Not only have segments of academia decided that deference to legislative wealth transfers is irrational, but disdain for special interest domination is a growing sentiment in the political arena.2 2 The attempts by the
Clinton Administration to create easily accesible, national discussion of
such issues as NAFTA and health care signify an effort to bypass the influence of special interests and to sell the Administration's agenda directly to
a broad audience. The appeal of "electronic nationwide townhall" proposals and candidates' defiant refusals to accept money from political action
committees further indicates that the acceptance of a political process
guided by bargaining among special interests is still subject to rethinking.
Indeed, thirty years ago, Buchanan predicted that the "excessive" "external costs involved in this continuous struggle for interests" would eventuKENT L. REV. 123, 146 n.66 (1989); Frank I. Michelman, Politics and Values or What's
Really Wrong with Rationality Review, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 487, 500-02 (1979); Cass R.
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN',. L. REv. 29 (1985); Cass R.
Sunstein, Naked Preferencesand the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689 (1984) [hereinafter Naked Preferences].
Gerald Gunther's criticism of deferential equal protection review of legislation affecting economic rights, see Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HaRv. L.
REv. 1, 20-21, 23 (1972), is often misinterpreted as a call for a return to Lochner. See, e.g.,
RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 622 (4th ed. 1992) (discussing Gunther).
However, as explained infra note 183, Gunther endorses post-Lochnerdeference to legislative justifications and calls only for stricter review to assure that the means employed
by the legislature are neither overinclusive nor underinclusive. Since legislatures are
prone to set forth justifications that give the statute a "public regarding" facade, Gunther's equal protection review would require a statute to live up to its facade and provide benefits to more than just a special interest group. See infra part IV.
20. "To the extent that the fiscal process, and politics generally, comes increasingly
to be viewed as a source for profit opportunities, unrestricted by constitutional
precepts, we must predict decreasing fiscal equity along with further departures from
efficiency, almost regardless of how these objectives are defined." James M. Buchanan,
Taxation in FiscalExchange, 6J. PUB. ECON. 17, 29 (1976); see also TOWARD A THEORY OF
THE RENT-SEEKING SocIETv (J. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980), especiallyKrueger, The Political
Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, J. BucHANA & G. TULLOc,, THE CALCULUS OF CONsENT: LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONsTrnoNAL DEMOCRACY (1962); George J. Stigler,
The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELLJ. EcoN. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971).
For an explanation of how petitioning costs stunt organization of majority support
for or opposition to legal change, even though the benefits of such support or opposition may exceed the petitioning costs, see MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION 2, 11-16 (2d ed. 1971).
For further explanation of this phenomenon and proposed remedies, see infra part I.
21. Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group TheoryJustfy More Intrusive JudicialPower?,
101 YALE LJ. 31, 63 (describing message sent by legal scholars using interest group
theory).
22. Id. at 64 ("[P]ersons of all political stripes decry the excessive political influence
of interest groups. Excessive interest group influence thus appears to be a universal
problem recognized and condemned by all observers.").
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ally lead to a popular backlash against the growth of special interest
politics: "As more and more groups organize to secure political support,
and as more and more discriminatory action does come to characterize
23
separate political decisions, reaction will surely set in at some point."
A quick reading of popular American academic literature and recent
American political rhetoric on legislative wealth transfers could easily convince a contingent of constitutional court justices in one of Eastern
Europe's new democracies that they should guide the national political
process away from domination by special interest bargaining. 24 For example, Nobel Prize winner Buchanan has explicitly asserted that a system with
strict constitutional constraints upon wealth transfers "is the only one that
is wholly consistent with what we may legitimately call 'democracy' or with
a social order that embodies 'democratic values,'" as opposed to "a quasiMarxist and exploitative view of government process."2 5 Such statements
by a leading Western thinker can strongly impact many East European
leaders, who desperately and sincerely seek guidance on how to bring
their countries from Communism to Western-style democracy.
Ironically, this American opposition to special interest legislation-a
movement often associated with the American right-has a special appeal
for jurists trained in Marxist-Leninist law schools filled with the "continuous propaganda of the value of equality... as the formally equal distribution of benefits." 26 Moreover, strict constitutional rules against special
interest legislation strike a favorable intellectual chord with certain individuals trying to leave the Communist era behind. After Communism's
metaphysical "mission" and pseudo-scientific pursuit of the public good
led to the state serving a select minority at a terrible expense to the rest of
society, significant segments of post-Communist society view the transition
as a chance for the empowerment of technical experts to rescue the "general welfare." 2 7 Constitutional rules against special interest legislation are
attractive to these segments because such rules stunt special interest
wealth transfers by requiring a scientifically verifiable connection to the
furtherance of the public good, rather than just a vague post-Lochner
28
objective.
Susceptibility to such outside influence may well underlie what tran23. BucHANAN & Tuu..ocK, supra note 20, at 290.

24. See Ethan Klingsberg, JudicialReview and Hungary's Transitionfrom Communism to
Democracy: The Constitutional Court, The Continuity of Law, and the Redefinition of Property
Rights, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REv. 41, 136-38 (discussing influence Western rhetoric has on
Eastern Europe's post-Communist legal framers).
25. Buchanan, supra note 20, at 28-29.
26. Peter Paczolay, Judicial Review of the Compensation Law in Hungay, 13 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 806, 814 (1992) (describing common perceptions of "constitutional" principles

in post-Communist culture).
27. See Klingsberg, supra note 24, at 134-36 & nn. 235-41 (discussing evidence that

"the scientific policy ideal" characterizes the transition from Communism) (citing survey showing that people voted for experts rather than parties or platforms).
28. Cf Hovencamp, supra note 4, at 379-80 (explaining Lochnerianjudicial review as

growing out of American intellectual trend marked by "obsession in the social sciences
with measurement and verification").
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spired during the 1990-91 term at the Hungarian Constitutional Court.2 9
During this important first eighteen months of the Court's existence, the
only judicial organ in Hungarian history with the authority to exercise
constitutional review issued a critical decision that appeared to implement
30
a Lochner-era approach to legislative wealth transfers.
Over the next three years, the Hungarian Constitutional Court underwent a shift away from Lochnerian review of wealth transfers to limited
acceptance of the products of special interest politics. The Court's stance
is now much closer to the U.S. judiciary's deferential approach, although
significant differences remain. The enticing literature of pro-Lochner
scholars, which was once so popular among certain figures at the Hungarian Constitutional Court, lost influence. This Article analyzes the political economy of the Hungarian Court's historic shift to show why this
movement away from Lochner was rational.
Part I explains the concept of "fiscal constitutionalism," as developed
by American political economists over the last thirty years. The fiscal constitutionalists recognize special interest transfers' sub-optimality. They
then build upon this recognition and, like the many advocates of distributional justice reforms, respond by attempting to fashion a means to avoid
the economic pitfalls emerging from our current system of pressure group
politics and transfers.
Part I describes the Lochnerian constitutional checks on all transfers
advocated by the fiscal constitutionalists and contrasts this approach with
the outcome oriented legislative plans endorsed by the distributional justice advocates. What distinguishes fiscal constitutionalism from distributional justice is the former's focus on the rational calculus that drives
political actors to endorse or to reject special interest politics. According
to fiscal constitutionalists, all distributional justice blueprints would
The response to Communism described above seems to have been quickly superseded once the new democracies failed to bring about immediate economic improvements. In post-Communist societies most people now appear to have given up on the
entire idea of the state pursuing a broad-based public good, regardless of the expertise
available to the state, and see primarily the potential for state action to serve narrow
special interests. See infra part II.A. See generally Ethan Klingsberg, Rebuilding Civil Society: Constitutionalism and the Post-Communist Paradox, 13 MICH. J. INTL. L. 865 (1992)
(explaining crisis of post-Communist civil society).
29. At that time, I was serving as a Counselor to the Court's Chief Justice and frequently providing him and his clerks with works like Richard Epstein's Takings: Private
Propertyand The Powerof Eminent Domain, which includes a controversial call for curbing

legislative influence to any but a limited set of "common pool" matters. See Rict-iARD A.
195-228, 30708 (1985) (only in "common pool" matters is state able to interfere without providing
just compensation); id. at 315-16 (opposing legislative transfers). In addition, one of the
Court's chief clerks attended a Federalist Society conference in the United States and
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN

returned deeply impressed by Professor Epstein's presentation.
30. The Court commenced operation inJanuary 1990. This Article concentrates on
the Court's review of a series of controversial pieces of special interest legislation:
enactments and bills providing benefits to victims of Communist property confiscations.
See infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. The last three years provided little other
case law by the Court to evaluate when tracking the trends discussed herein.
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require a benevolent dictator for implementation, because no majority of
rational actors would ever choose to restrict special interest transfers when
the setting is the day-to-day legislative bargaining of democratic politics.
By contrast, the fiscal constitutionalism school argues, rational actors will
endorse restrictions upon special interest wealth transfers willingly when
the setting is decision making about long term constitutional rules.
Part I then points out that the long term constitutional perspective
dreamed of by the fiscal constitutionalists seemed doomed to ivory tower
debates until Eastern Europe decided to undertake wholesale constitutional reform after the collapse of Communism in 1989. This part
describes why the Hungarian Constitutional Court was in an ideal position
to exercise this constitutional perspective on special interest transfers.
The text of the Hungarian Constitution, while ambiguous, provided tools
for setting forth such rules against special interest transfers. Moreover,
institutional factors unique to the Court during its first years of existence
immunized the Court from the usual handicaps that prevent a court from
setting forth rational political economic rules. Part I concludes that evaluation of the constitutional rules the Hungarian Court developed offers a
unique opportunity for testing the fiscal constitutionalism thesis that the
rational decision from a constitutional perspective is to set forth rules
restricting special interest transfers. Moreover, this part foreshadows
those hermeneutic flaws with fiscal constitutionalism that were uncovered
by the Hungarian Court's eventual development of constitutional rules
facilitatingspecial interest politics.
Part II moves from theoretical background to concrete decision making. This section relates the Constitutional Court's path toward and then
away from fiscal constitutionalism. Part II includes analysis of Court opinions and the political background against which those opinions were
issued.
Part III then shows why the "rational" arguments in favor of Lochnerstyle restrictions on special interest politics set forth by fiscal constitutionalists, whose adherents are among those active in advising new democracies, 31 simply did not make sense as constitutional rules in an East
31. Although I am not a doctrinal follower, I have on numerous occasions discussed
the insights of Epstein and Buchanan during my stints as Counselor to the ChiefJustice
of the Hungarian Constitutional Court and as lecturer and organizer at numerous seminars, workshops, and courses throughout'the former Communist regions (from Budapest to Bishkek) on behalf of the Soros Foundations. Other groups, such as George
Mason University's Institute for Humane Studies, have similarly explained these "conservative" law and economic theories abroad and been criticized by left wing colleagues
back home, in the words of one American law professor, "for trying to sell abroad what
they cannot even sell at home." "Trying to sell" is an unfair metaphor for what is simply
teaching, especially when the atmosphere is that of an American style give-and-take
seminar. Even if some of the advice offered by American "experts" over the last three
years was skewed toward the American context or a particular ideological bent, those
exposed to the stimulating atmosphere of these programs will be able to come around
to a rational outcome suitable to their own context, as this Article's analysis implies. All
of these programs functioned as an important source of intellectual fuel in a region
where knowledge ofjurisprudence, political theory, and economics was at a pitiful low.
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European transition from state socialism to republican democracy. When
determining what constitutional rules would result from a rational
calculus, the fiscal constitutionalists underestimated the role of context.
The fiscal constitutionalists were correct in arguing that the considerations
that influence rational decisions made from a normal legislative perspective differ from those considerations that influence rational decisions
made from a constitutional perspective. However, their vision of a
rational constitutional calculus neglected the hermeneutic truth that what
is rational can never emerge from a tabula rasa, but must emerge from a
set of contextual factors. These contextual factors may well render irrational, as was the case here, what Western academics perceive to be optimal rules. Part III explains the three most important contextual factors
that, contrary to conventionally accepted political economic wisdom,
render it rational for emerging Eastern European democracies to adopt
constitutional rules facilitating special interest transfers.
Part IV shows how the Constitutional Court abandoned a Lochner
approach for a slightly different path than that chosen by the post-Lochner
U.S. Supreme Court. Part IV examines how the path chosen by the Hungarian Court informs contemporary debates in the United States over the
future of equal protection jurisprudence. Thus, this article draws a range
of related lessons, for both American economists and jurists, from the
Hungarian Constitutional Court's roller coaster ride from strong endorsement to rejection of Lochner-style review of wealth transfers during its first
three years of existence.
I.

Fiscal Constitutionalism: The Quest to Synthesize Rational
Economic Calculus with Constitutional Rulemaldng

Economists over the last three decades have dedicated a great deal of
energy to analyzing the calculus of consent that underlies legislation and
regulation in a democracy.3 2 The conclusion reached overwhelmingly in
such analyses is that allegiance to special interests has come to play an
authoritative role in such calculi, and therefore democratic consent currently tends almost exclusively to support sub-optimal 33 economic bar32. See, e.g., Gary Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups For Political
Influence, 98 QJ. EcoN. 371 (1983); see also infra note 131 (discussing analyses by Becker
and others that indicate that special interest bargaining in legislatures has certain constructive characteristics).
33. Criticism of legislative wealth transfers as "sub-optimal" usually signifies that the
gains to the interest groups are smaller than the losses to the society as a whole resulting from the legislative wealth transfer. Critics of special interest wealth transfers use
different standards to measure variations from Pareto optimality: majoritarianism (benefits a greater number of persons that it hurts), wealth maximization (benefits some by
a greater number of dollars than it hurts others), utility maximization (same with utility), and distributive justice (brings society closer to a given "just" distribution). See
Elhauge, supra note 21, at 58-59.
Buchanan concedes that strict enforcement of constitutional rules against special
interest transfers may "prevent the attainment of the Pareto frontier in many cases";
however, he concludes that "the degree of possible inefficiency may be relatively small
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gains that transfer wealth to, or otherwise subsidize, narrow interests.3 4
Some economists have even gone so far as to condemn the bargains that
typically emerge from contemporary politics as not only sub-optimal but
also antidemocratic, because the transfers benefit minority factions at the
35
expense of the majority.
A.

The Evils of Legislative Wealth Transfers to Special Interests

Economists denounce special interest legislation for a variety of reasons.
First, state giveaways inspire the "socially-wasteful" dedication of resources
to nonproductive rent-seeking3 6 conduct by interest groups. 37 Second,
the availability of wealth transfers provides disincentives to dedicate
38
energy toward productive ends.
Third, competition for special interest transfers drives a society
toward increased factionalization and may even inspire secessionism. 39
One of many possible contributing factors to the alarming trend of secessionism throughout the former Communist world is the unique intensity
of rent-seeking competition there. After the collapse of Communism, the
state continued to function as the main source of resources, while the
police state's restraints upon factionalism were replaced with civil liberties
(without any accompanying traditions of civility in relations between factions). Fierce competition among society's desperately needy ethnic
groups to turn the post-Communist state into their sponsor led to calls for
cleansing the population of rent-seeking competitors and the formation of
separate states. A destructive legacy of Marxist-Leninism is the popular
40
belief that the state can play the role of savior by wealth transfers.
compared with the potentiality" for sub-optimality that emerges from special interest
politics. Buchanan, supra note 20, at 24.
34. See supra note 20; Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic
System, 98 HARv. L. Rxv. 4, 16 n.16 (1984) (bibliography of pertinent economic
literature).
35. See supra notes 21, 25 and accompanying text.
36. "Rent-seeking" signifies efforts to transfer profits ("rents") of productive activity
to a privileged few.
37. Buchanan, supra note 20, at 26 (denouncing "resource wastage involved in
attempts to capture and to control collective decision-making" as potentially even
"swamp[ing] the potentially realizable surplus" from "public-goods provision" legislation);

DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 229-35

(1989); Robert D. Tollison, Rent

Seeking: A Survey, 35 KY.RLos 575, 576-83 (1982). For a seminal explanation, see R.H.
Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959) (explaining
wasteful and quasi-corrupt consequences of rent-seeking in connection with the free
distribution of broadcast frequency licenses).
38. BucHauAN, supra note 15, at 320-21, 323 (describing responses to transfers);
BRENNAN & BucHANAN, supra note 2, at 114 (explaining distributive justice's negative
effect upon efficient production from both the tax and the transfer side).
39. BucHANAN, supra note 15, at 317-19 (explaining how the unrestrained democratic politics of fiscal transfers can lead to secessionism as a limit upon such politics).
40. See Herbert Kitschelt, The Formationof Party Systems in East CentralEurope, 20 PoLt
& Soc'v 7, 16-20 (1992) (describing affinity of ethnic extremists to internal economic
logic of state socialism). This linking of secessionist impulses with an affinity for rentseeking is more applicable to Slovakia and Croatia, where ethnic primordialists and
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Finally, the condemnation of special interest wealth transfers stems
from the economic literature establishing that such legislative action represents neither the will nor rational interest of the majority.4' This argument addresses concern for both efficiency and democratic values.
Special interests can usually influence a legislature more effectively than
the diffuse majority because lobbying by special interests entails minimal
transaction costs in connection with the organization and the dissemination of information necessary for mobilization. In particular, special interest groups usually can overcome, more easily than the majority, the
42
obstacles posed by such transaction costs as free riding.
B.

Responding to the Evils of Special Interest Politics

The temptation, to which legal scholars often succumb, is to respond to
these economic observations by advocating judicial intervention as a check
upon interest group oriented laws and regulations. Another response is to
advocate an optimal distribution of resources, presumably in the hope that
those currently misguiding the democratic process will read about such a
blueprint, become enlightened, and abandon their sub-optimal ways for a
thoughtful ideal plan.
Both of these responses replace the calculus currently underlying the
democratic process with a calculus removed from the democratic process.
Intrusive judicial review proposals replace the calculus underlying contemporary politics with the calculus of an enlightened class ofjudges. 43 Institutional economic analyses show, however, that U.S. courts are structured
in a manner that disables them from pursuing such enlightened rational
economic ends. 44 The advocates of intrusive judicial review never explain
advocates of a large state sector converge, in contrast with the secessionist elements in
Slovenia and the Czech Republic, which have tended to be more free market leaning.
The ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe are actually a product of a multiplicity of
factors. Ethan Klingsberg, InternationalHuman Rights Intervention on Behalf of Minorities
in Post-World War I and ContemporarjEasternEurope: Placebo,Poison, orPanacea?,1 ROUNDTABLE (forthcoming 1994) (outlining various historical and contemporary factors
responsible for East European ethnic tensions and then explaining why pessimism
about these ethnic conflicts may be overstated). Roundtable is a new interdisciplinary
journal of the University of Chicago Law School.
41. For a survey of the economic literature making this point, see, e.g., Easterbrook,
supra note 34, at 16 n.16 (supporting observation that "[1]aws that benefit the people in
common are hard to enact because... [s]maller, more cohesive groups are more effective lobbyists." Id. at 15.).
42. MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS 18 (1982).

43. Elhauge, supra note 21, at 59-65 (judicial review as check upon interest group
politics actually means imposition of substantive visions ofjudges upon polity).
44. See infra part I.D.2 (explaining the four fundamental institutional factors that
prevent courts from functioning as rational economic decisionmakers: stare decisis, ex
post dispute resolution context, influence of special interests on litigation process, and
the focus on views of litigants and amici curiae); see alsoJonathan R. Macey, Promoting
Public-RegardingLegislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 223, 241-42 (1986) ("activists' view of the Constitution as vesting in the
federal courts broad authority to strike down special interest statutes has not explained
why judges are any better than legislators at regulating").
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why a judge, amid such an institutional context, would adopt the rational
viewpoints of learned economists.
Similarly, those endorsing distributional justice formulas never
explain how they will convert lawmakers dominated by interest group politics to their plans. Due to the aforementioned information and transaction costs that facilitate special interest domination of legislative activity,
the legislature is unlikely to take the initiative to constrain interest group
behavior. Outcome oriented formulas for distribution of resources can be
based only upon "purely hypothetical consent" 45 and implicitly depend
46
upon the calculus of a "benevolent despot" for implementation.
C.

The Fiscal Constitutionalism Response

A unique response to the disturbing findings of interest group economics
attempts to synthesize the ideal of willing consent with the goal of restricting interest group transfers. This response turns to the concept of "fiscal
constitutionalism" as the vehicle for salvation. According to this proposal,
"organizational rules" limiting the evils of special interest wealth transfers
can be implemented as part of constitution making.47 Such rules "require
that those individuals and groups securing differential benefits also bear
the differential costs" 48 -i.e., elimination of the evil of special interest
rent-seeking by adoption of a strict Lochnerian49 rule that there are no differential rents to seek.
The implicit source of the fiscal rules in the typical distributional justice plan is "externally imposed ethical criteria" that are contrary to the
rational calculi of actors in the context of contemporary politics. By contrast, the fiscal constitutionalists claim to avoid "external imposition"
because their limitations are based upon rules to which constitution makers, as opposed to day-to-day legislators, will gladly consent. Fiscal constitutionalism's claim to a basis in consent rests upon a distinction between
the rational calculus of consent with respect to constitutional rules and
with respect to "in-period"5 0 or day-to-day legislation.
The basis for a distinction between "in-period" rule making and "genuine constitutional choice" is that only the latter's product (constitutional
45. BRENNAN & BucHANAN, supra note 2, at 103 & n.4 (1985) (emphasis in original)
(criticizing Rawls among others); see also Ronald Dworkin, The OriginalPosition, 40 U.
CHI. L. REv. 500 (1973).
46. BRENNAN & BucHANAN, supra note 2, at 132.

47.' BucrHANAN & TuLLocK, supra note 20, at 291. References here to the "fiscal

constitutionalism school" are to the scholarship on constitutional economics by James
Buchanan, Geoffrey Brennan, Gordon Tullock, Robert Tollison, and Robert McCor-

mick, among others. Buchanan sometimes refers to this approach as that of "the Virginia school."
48. Id. at 292.
49. For a discussion of the Lochner era approach to special interest transfers, see
supra Introduction.
50. "In-period" is the jargon used by fiscal constitutionalists to refer to the political
context surrounding legislating and regulating, as opposed to constitutional rulemaking. See, e.g., BRENNAN & BucHANAN, supra note 2, at 132.
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rules) are "quasi-permanent." 51 An aura of uncertainty about the future
pervades decision making about quasi-permanent rules.5 2 Nobody knows
who will be the potentially exploited party or beneficiary of tomorrow's
special interest bargaining, yet everybody can tell that in the long run special interest rent-seeking will leave everybody worse off. From such a long
term constitutional perspective, even supporters of special interests will
perceive that a rule facilitating rent-seeking will ultimately cost each separate interest group more in the way of wealth transfers to other groups
53
than any group itself can expect to receive from the transfers it obtains.
Moreover, the societal costs of adopting a quasi-permanent rule permitting special interest transfers are far greater than the costs of any single inperiod transfer. 54 Accordingly, the fiscal constitutionalists argue, the
calculus of consent to constitutional rules will be based upon "genuinely
enlightened self-interests" as opposed to narrow, short term self-interests
that characterize consent with respect to "in-period" politics. 55 Especially
with respect to the issue of the "transfer budget," the calculus of consent
will drive individuals in a constitution making setting "to select among
alternatives in accordance with generally-applicable criteria of 'fairness,'
'equity,' and 'efficiency,' rather than fully identifiable self-interest."5 6
Thus, the economics of constitutional creation appear to dictate that constraints upon special interest legislation can and will be installed only at
the constitutional level.
D.

The Rare Opportunity Presented by Eastern Europe for the
Implementation of Fiscal Constitutionalism

57
The fiscal constitutionalism proposal, first set forth over thirty years ago,
seemed doomed to ivory tower debates, as there was little chance that any
democracy would take time out from special interest politics and set the
stage for constitutional reform of the fiscal process.5 8 The monumental
constitutional reform in Eastern Europe presented a rare opportunity for
fiscal constitutionalism to take root.

51. Buchanan, supra note 20, at 27.
52. Id.
53. Macey, supra note 44, at 246-47 & n.108 (quoting McCoRMicK & ToLiSON,
supra note 6, at 127 (providing examples of how special interest groups that lobby suc-

cessfully for their own special interest legislation ultimately experience a negative-sum
gain due to the costs imposed by legislation benefiting other special interests)).
54. Macey, supra note 44, at 246-47.
55. BucHuANAN & Tuu.ocK, supra note 20, at 291.
56. Buchanan, supra note 20, at 27.

57. BucHtAN & TuLuocK, supra note 20.
58. Arguably, constitutional reform takes place all the time in the United States
through the institution of the judiciary. However, at least in the United States, institutional factors prevent courts from having the rational economic perspective that the
fiscal constitutionalists attributed to constitution making. For discussion of those institutional factors and explanation of why they do not apply to the Hungarian Constitutional Court, see infra part I.D.2.
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The HungarianConstitution's Text: Tools For Implementing Fiscal
Constitutionalism

In Hungary, the text of the post-Communist Constitution 59 provided a
prospect, but not a guarantee, that fiscal constitutionalism would be
implemented. The post-1989 text contained a strongly worded "takings"
clause limiting state interferences with property to "exceptional" circumstances in the "public interest." 6 0 Such a text could be read either to
6
restrict or to permit legislative wealth transfers. '
Article 9, as originally amended during the final months of the Communist regime, contained an explicit limitation upon special interest legislation in its prohibition against any act that violated "the principle of
neutrality towards competition" without the support of a two-thirds majority. 62 However, an amendment adopted upon the convening of the freely
elected Parliament replaced this principle with the more ambiguous
phrase: "The Republic of Hungary shall recognize and support the right
to enterprise and the freedom of economic competition."6 3 This watereddown phrase arguably prohibits the enactment of special interest legislation because such laws violate the constitutional mandate to "recognize
and support," rather than interfere with, "economic competition." On the
other hand, the amendment could be interpreted as a movement away
from Lochnerianstrictness.
The Constitution also contains an "equal protection clause"6 4 and a
limited list of positive social rights.6 5 A legislative wealth transfer to one of
these constitutionally designated special causes could not violate the equal
protection clause. 6 6 When it comes to reviewing a standard "naked"
wealth transfer by the legislature, however, the Hungarian Constitution
(much like the U.S. Constitution) provides tools, although not unambigu59. The post-Communist Hungarian Constitution is technically the Stalinist document, but it is amended almost entirely. The revisions are the product of Roundtable
negotiations with opposition representatives during the summer of 1989, ratification on
October 23, 1989 by the outgoing reform Communist Parliament, and a few further
amendments by over two-thirds of the first freely elected Parliament. For an analysis of
the referendums and other republican processes underlying the post-Communist Constitution of Hungary, see Klingsberg, supra note 24, at 48-53.
60. A MAGvu K~zrARsASAG ALKOTMANYA [Constitution] ch. I, art. 13(2) (Hung.)
(Hungarian Constitutional Court's Official English Translation) (Dec. 31, 1990) (on
file with the author) [hereinafter Hungarian Constitution].

61. Compare the discussions of the U.S. Constitution's similar takings clause in
EPSTEIN, supra note 29, with Thomas Grey, The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI L.

REv.21 (1986).
62. A MAGYAR KoZ-rARSAsAG ALKOTMANYA [Constitution] (Hung.) (as amended Oct.
23, 1989) (English translation on file with the author).
63. Hungarian Constitution, supra note 60, ch. I, art. 9(2).
64. Hungarian Constitution, supra note 60, ch. XII, art. 70/A.

65. Those positive social rights include: healthy environment, id. ch. I, art. 18; education, health care, family, and care for children, see id. ch. XII, arts. 66, 67, 70/D, 70/F.
66. This was the Hungarian Constitutional Court's holding in the first equal protection challenge to special interest legislation. Judgment of Apr. 25, 1990 (Income Tax
Differential Case), Alkotmdnybir6sig [Constitutional Law Court], No. 9/1990 (Hung.),
reviewed by L. SOLYOM, REPORT ON THE FiRsT YEAR OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 47

(1991).
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ous guidelines, for implementing constitutional rules proscribing special
interest politics.

2.

67

The New Hungarian ConstitutionalCourt: Ideal Vehicle for Rational
Constitutional Calculus

Whether the new Hungarian Constitution embodied fiscal constitutionalism or condoned special interest politics was to be decided by the judiciary. At this point, many law and economics scholars would immediately
dismiss the possibility of Hungary adopting optimal constitutional rules,
simply because these scholars perceive any court, even a detached high
court like the U.S. Supreme Court, as an institutionally inadequate organ
for such a task. However, judicial review in the new Hungary was designed
in such a way that the institutional pitfalls usually attributed to courts by
skeptical law and economics commentators do not apply.
Four institutional pitfalls hinder the capacity of most courts to interpret the text of a constitution (or statute) in a manner that reflects an
optimal political economic calculus. First, courts usually must rest their
decisions upon an analogy to previous decisions. 68 Case law precedents
rarely reflect optimal economic rules due to special interest litigants' "policy of molding precedent through strategic settlement" 69 and the other
institutional pitfalls of courts described hereinafter.
Second, the judicial role of dispute resolver drives courts to take an ex
post perspective, and thereby pay "attention to today's unfortunate," at the
expense of ex ante "attention to the effects of the rules" set forth in decisions. 70 Such an ex ante perspective, that of rule maker, is essential to
71
formulating rules that promote future efficiency.
Third, the litigation process will usually be subject to the same distortions as the political process. The diffuse majority will likely be "unable to
organize efforts to influence the litigation process," while the special interests will "enjoy organizational advantages in collecting resources" and
therefore "fund more frequent and more skillful litigation," just as they
72
fund better lobbying efforts in the legislature.
Finally, courts will often overlook arguments for "the policy or rule
that is best for society," because they must focus on the narrow interests of
the litigants and amici curiae involved in the case. 73 These latter two pitfalls indicate that judicial decisions are just as likely to reflect the suboptimality of special interest politics as is the legislature.
67. See Naked Preferences, supra note 19, at 1689 (discussing how takings clause, equal
protection clause, and other provisions are "united by a common theme and focused
on a single underlying evil: the distribution of resources or opportunities to one group
rather than another solely on the ground that those favored have exercised raw political
power to obtain what they want").
68. Easterbrook, supra note 34, at 7-12.
69. Elhauge, supra note 21, at 79.
70. Easterbrook, supra note 34, at 12.
71. Id.
72. Elhauge, supra note 21, at 67-68, 70, 77.
73. Elhauge, supra note 21, at 77.
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None of these institutional pitfalls plagued the Hungarian Constitutional Court, which was the sole judicial organ with the authority to set
forth binding constitutional rules. 74 As the Court was starting out in 1990,
the burden of stare decisis was non-existent, and therefore the first concern is irrelevant. 75 In addition, the loose nature of the Court's justiciability and jurisdictional rules, as well as the Court's self-image, resulted
in a vast majority of its opinions, including the ones pertinent to fiscal
of rule maker as opposed
constitutionalism, adopting the ex ante position
76
to the ex post position of dispute resolver.
The third and fourth concerns are rendered harmless by the nature
of the constitutional litigation process in Hungary. Review of new laws by
the Court is routine rather than the product of organized litigation campaigns. Cost efficient acts such as an anonymous letter to the Court are
sufficient to invoke review. Moreover, the Court does not limit its review
to the challenges and arguments set forth in petitions and briefs. The
Court actively seeks out and relies upon experts, frequently from
academia, while regularly exercising its prerogative to ignore submissions
77
from litigants.
In the absence of these institutional pitfalls, the Hungarian Constitutional Court was an organ with potential to undertake a rational constitutional calculus. Yet, as the next part of this Article will show, the Court
eventually set forth constitutional rules that differ from those predicted by
the fiscal constitutionalists. The fiscal constitutionalists had a provocative
insight when they argued that the rational calculus governing constitu78
tional rulemaking differs from that governing "in-period" legislation.
The fiscal constitutionalists' prediction about the rational calculus of constitutional rulemaking, however, is ironically subject to the same hermeneutic flaw that they perceived in the distributional justice literature. The
fiscal constitutional school correctly perceived that the context of "inperiod" legislating renders distributional justice plans presociological.
Legislators acting rationally in an age of interest group politics will never
implement such ideal schemes. What the fiscal constitutionalism school
missed was that the context of constitutional rule making also may render
the adoption of rules restraining interest group wealth transfers irrational.
Fiscal constitutionalism considers only presociological (non-contextual) economic theory when confidently relying on "the possibility of lifting the determination of the redistributive transfer budget out of the
74. See Klingsberg, supranote 24, at 53-80.
75. As this article will show, stare decisis actually dictated in favor of what Buchanan
would consider optimal constitutional rules. See infra part II.
76. See Klingsberg, supra note 24, at 61-64 (explaining the Court's self-image and
justiciability standards as leading to a "beyond dispute resolution" scenario); id. at 12025 (explaining roots of Court's ex ante rule making approach in Hungarian legal
tradition).
77. Id. at 61-64, 120-25. As demonstrated infra part III.B, the Hungarian Court is
not institutionally blind to special interest politics. The Court permits special interest
politics to influence it in a way necessary for democracy to flourish.
78. See supra part I.C.
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jurisdiction of in-period majoritarian politics and making it a matter of
explicit constitutional compact."79 This cannot necessarily be done in certain contexts, even when the constitutional rule makers engage in a
rational calculus when determining rules governing wealth transfers. As
will be shown, interest in the successful growth of democracy skews the
rational constitutional calculus against the results sought by the fiscal
constitutionalists. 80
II.

The Hungarian Constitutional Court's Attempt to Employ Fiscal
Constitutionalism

A.

Democracy's Dawn and the Immediate Rise of Interest Group
Politics

In the wake of the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe in 1989, the
former peasant landowners and the pre-Communist religious organizations were the first pressure groups to organize in the new democracies
generally and in Hungary in particular.8 1 Even though these groups constituted minority factions,8 2 they had the optimum characteristics for
effective political action. Transaction costs were low as a result of their
pre-Communist organizational legacies, well-defined group interests, and
access to highly motivating historical rhetoric in an era of both future
uncertainty83 and cynicism about the immediate past.8 4 Supporters of the
79. BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 2, at 132 (naively concluding, "This can, of
course, be done." Id.).
80. Ironically, the fiscal constitutionalists claim to place concern for democratic feasibility at "centerstage." Id. at 117.
81. See Klingsberg, supra note 28, at 893-94 & n.20 (explaining rise of "unchecked
special interests" trying to resurrect pre-Communist eras and convert transition into
narrow revolutionary victory) (citing TIMOTHY G. ASH, THE MAGIC LArERN 146 (1990),
on rise of former peasant landowner pressure groups). Legislation providing special
benefits to former landowners and pre-Communist churches has been at the forefront
of post-Communist legislative agendas in every former Communist country in Eastern
and Central Europe as a result of this development.
82. All surveys indicate overwhelming popular opposition to these two factions and
their rent-seeking. In the March 1990 elections, the Smallholders, representing the
former peasant landowners, only had the support of 11.7% of the voters, while the
Christian Democrats, representing the pre-Communist churches, attained a mere 6.5%
of the popular vote. A Gallup survey conducted in June 1989 showed that only 18% of
the population favored returning land to pre-Communist owners and only 9% of the
population endorsed returning other types of property to the original owners. E.
Hankiss, Between Two Worlds, in RESEARCH RvEw: PROJECT No. 2, CHANGING VALUES IN
HUNGARIAN SocIErY 55 (P. Somalai ed., 1989). Another survey conducted in March
1991 showed that two-thirds of the population opposed the concept of giving special
benefits to pre-Communist property owners. See Klingsberg, supra note 24, at 84 n.101.
The return of schools to church ownership under the terms of the Church Property
Act, see infra note 95 and accompanying text, has outraged large numbers of parents.
D. Fink, Church and School Grapple, BUDAPEST SUN, Mar. 25-31, 1993, at 1-2. In addition,
many occupants have refused to vacate buildings turned over to a church. Edith Oltay,
Controversy Over Restitution of Church Property in Hungary, 2 RFE/RL RESEARCH REPoRT,
Feb. 5, 1993, at 54, 55.
83. For discussion of the post-Communist preference for looking backward, see
Ethan Klingsberg, Fi/e Fever, N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 22, 1993 (Op-Ed), at All.
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former peasant landowners had the additional benefit of concentration in
particular geographic areas 8 5
Furthermore, former peasant landholders and pre-Communist religious organizations functioned as effective pressure groups in the new legislatures because they had already incurred the startup costs of lobbying as
a byproduct of other functions.8 6 First, these groups incurred startup
costs prior to Communism. In particular, the peasant landowners successfully organized the Independent Smallholders Party in 1920 to bring
about a major land reform in 1945 favorable to their interests.8 7 The former peasant landowners and churches resurrected, respectively, the Smallholders Party and the Christian Democrat Party from the pre-Communist
era.8 8 Second, these groups incurred startup costs running as independent political parties in the Spring 1990 elections, rather than simply functioning as non-partisan lobbying groups upon the commencement of the
legislative session.
Third, they incurred startup costs by negotiating successfully for strategic positions in the Parliament's majority coalition and Council of Ministers immediately after the Spring 1990 elections.8 9 Even though these two
parties combined for only sixteen percent of the Parliamentary seats, their
well-defined, narrow, rent-seeking agendas enabled them successfully to
84. For discussion of factors that make for an effective pressure group, see McCoRMICK & ToLuiSOn, supra note 6, at 42-44; Becker, supra note 32; Sam Peltzman, Toward a

More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & EcoN. 211 (1976).
85. Ellen Comisso, Legacies of the Past or New Institutions? The Struggle Over Restitution in Hungary 7, Paper Presented at University of Chicago Conference on Restitution in Eastern Europe (June 18-19, 1993) (copy on file with author) (concentration of
Smallholder supporters in eastern and southern Hungary: Bekes, Bacs-Kiskum, and
Somogy); see MUELLER, supra note 37, at 239 (citing geographic concentration as significant factor lowering organizational costs for pressure groups).
The former peasant landowners also had an extremely energetic political entrepreneur enthusiastically pressing for their special interests as he sought to advance his own
public position.
86. Robert D. Tollison sets forth this thesis that groups enjoy an advantage in rentseeking competition when they have already incurred the startup costs of lobbying as a
byproduct of some other function. See Tollison, supra note 37, at 575, 590.
In political science jargon, these special interests were no longer "pressure groups"
engaged in "lobbying," but "one-issue parties" once they incurred the start-up costs of
representing their interests by forming their one-issue political parties. For purposes of
this analysis, however, they were still functioning as pressure groups bargaining in the
legislhture, and therefore this article sometimes strays from the technically correct
jargon.
87. This was Hungary's only major land reform prior to Communist reforms and
abuses. See generally Klingsberg, supra note 24, at 105 & n.158 (citing historical sources).
The Christian Democrat Party was also a "sleeping beauty" party that represented
church interests in the political arena both prior to and following Communism.
88. Reliance on the pre-Communist reputations and rhetoric of these parties was
more significant than resurrection of the actual pre-Communist apparati of these parties. To a certain extent, surviving Communist era (1960s) agricultural structures also
facilitated the organization of some former peasant landowners.
89. In Hungary, Smallholders have influence in the Agriculture Ministry, and Christian Democrats headed government affairs in connection with religion and religious
education. See Karoly Okolicsanyi, HungarianCompensation Off to a Slow Start, 2 RFE/RL
REsEARc REPORT, Mar. 12, 1993, at 49, 52; Oltay, supra note 82, at 56.
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bargain their way into the ruling coalition. Their coalition partner, the
Hungarian Democratic Forum (forty-two percent of the seats), had to
agree to endorse only single wealth transfers to win the support of each of
these factions. Furthermore, structural characteristics of the new Hungarian legislature-unicameralism and lawmaking, in most instances, by
simple majority9° -facilitated the capacity of discrete factions to ensure
the passage of legislation furthering their respective interests. 9 1 Thus, by
the time it came to parliamentary bargaining for special interest legislation in the summer of 1990, the organizational costs for these groups were
minimal.
The ensuing efforts by the Hungarian Parliament to provide benefits
to these two groups, under the auspices of providing "restitution" or "compensation" to victims of Communist era property confiscations, gave rise to
the new democracy's first controversy over special interest legislation.
Although the enactments had such labels as "restitution" and "compensation," which "concerned defining the meaning ofjustice in the post-socialist political order" 92 and alluded to questions of national self-definition,
what was really at stake was "the crass economic issue" of "who would get
how much" out of the new democratic system. 93 In both the Compensation Act9 4 and the Church Property Act, 95 the ruling parliamentary coali-

tion responded to pressure from its minority factions (the Smallholders
90. See Hungarian Constitution, supra note 60, ch. II, art. 24; cf.id. ch. XII, arts. 5863, 65, 68-69, 70/C, 70/H.
91. BucHANAN & TuLLocK, supra note 20 (discussing institutional effect of different
lawmaking structures on capacity for special interest rent-seeking).
92. Comisso, supra note 85, at 30.
93. Id. The use of the terms "restitution" and "compensation" throughout this Article is potentially misleading. This Article uses these terms solely as labels or as indices,
rather than as semantic or actual descriptions of the legislative transfers to the former
peasant landowners and pre-Communist churches. These special interest benefits were
never deemed to be inherent entitlements stemming from the contemporary validity of
those groups' pre-Communist property rights, except in some unpopular speeches on
the floor of Parliament. See supra note 82 (public sentiment on claims of pre-Communist landowners and churches); infra text accompanying note 145 (describing
Comisso's analysis of "historical continuity" aspects of compensation acts). Instead,
these legislative transfers were consistently categorized as "ex gratia benefits," see, e.g.,
Judgment of Apr. 20, 1991 (Compensation Case II), Alkotmfinybir6s5g [Constitutional
Law Court], No. 16/1991 (IV.20)AB § 111(2) (Hung.) (official translation on file with
the author) [hereinafter Compensation Case I] or "government created entitlements" in
U.S. legal terminology, Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (explaining
how "independent sources such as state law" create entitlements). For more discussion
of the legal determination that these transfers were not mandated restitutionary compensation, see infra note 105.
94. Act on Partial Compensation for Damages Unlawfully Caused by the State, No.
XXV (1991) (Hung.) (enactedJune 26,1991) [hereinafter Compensation Act] and Government Decree 104/1991 (Hung.) (Aug. 3, 1991) (copies of original Hungarian, as
well as German and English translations, on file with the author).
95. Act Concerning the Property Situation of Formal Church Ownership, No.
XXXII (1991) (Hung.) [hereinafter Church PropertyAct], cited inJudgment of Feb. 12,
1993 (Church Property Case), Alkotmdnybir6sfig [Constitutional Law Court], No. 4/
1993 (11.12) § A(3) (Hung.) (official translation on file with the author) [hereinafter
Church Property Case].
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and the Christian Democrats, respectively) to create special entitlements
on behalf of distinct minority interests: pre-Communist peasant landowners and pre-Communist churches. The initial Smallholder bill provided
for "re-privatization" or return of land confiscated during Communist agricultural collectivization drives, while the Christian Democrats advocated
the return of church property seized pursuant to Communist nationalization policies. The enacted versions contained watered-down versions of
these proposals. The former landowners received "compensation coupons" 96 sufficient to purchase some of the property that had been confiscated by the Communists, while the churches received their old buildings
97
but not their old land.
The enactments provided these narrow benefits at the expense of the
majority98 and most probably, although it has never been calculated scientifically, the public interest. The property giveaways and their accompanying administrative costs99 contributed to the dangerously high deficit10 0
96. Compensation Act, supra note 94, para. 5.
97. Church Property Case, supra note 95, § 1(2) (c).
98. The Compensation Act provides approximately $1.7 billion worth of property
rights to the 608,000 individuals with validly filed claims. Approximately 826,000 people filed claims. Okolicsanyi, supra note 89, at 49-52. Accordingly, only about 4% of the
population will receive a direct benefit. Moreover, the 608,000 claim figure represents
a greater number of beneficiaries than the Smallholders who sponsored and supported
the initial version of the Act. The figure includes 30,000 foreigners, as well as victims of
pre-1949 takings (due to the Constitutional Court intervention explained infra part V)
and victims of political persecution covered in a compensation act passed on May 12,

1992 and not covered in this article. Id.
The Church Property Act provides for the return to religious organizations of all
buildings confiscated by the state after January 1, 1948. The churches also receive
financial aid for reconstruction. Thus, the churches receive their former places of worship, monasteries, hospitals, dormitories, senior citizens' homes, schools, and nurseries,
but not their former huge tracts of open land. Thirteen churches have submitted 6,200
claims. Over half of those claims come from the Catholic Church. The 1993 budget
allocates 2 billion forint ($20 million) for restitution of church property, plus a large
part of the 3 billion forint ($30 million) budget for church activities goes to funding the
use of the returned buildings. Yet, even this significant slice of the national budget is
proving inadequate to satisfy the entitlements the Parliament has granted to the
Church. Oltay, supra note 82, at 54-57. Arguably the provision of benefits to the preCommunist churches has a greater claim to serving the general welfare than the provision of benefits to former peasant landowners because of the nature of church endeavors. However, many of those who had been using buildings, especially education
related structures, that have been re-possessed by the church may disagree. See supra
note 82. Both of these statutes were compromises of the strong demands originally
made by the respective special interests. See infra part III.A.
99. The administrative costs of the Compensation Act are staggering. The Compensation Office employs 1,500 people, which is twice as many as the central office of the
Agriculture Ministry, and the Office had a budget in 1992 of 1.9 billion forint ($19
million). Okolicsanyi, supra note 89.
100. Hungary has Eastern Europe's largest per capita debt. The gross external debt
at the end of 1993 was estimated at 24.5 billion U.S. dollars by the Office of Economic
Cooperation and Development, up from 20.4 billion U.S. dollars at the end of 1989, as
reported by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. See Data Sheet of
the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (on file with the author).
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and inflation rate.' 0 1 Moreover, the laws gave the select beneficiaries an
advantage over the majority of individuals and private organizations in the
new free market of economic and ideological competition.' 0 2 Thus, the
transfers failed from both utilitarian and egalitarian perspectives.
The Constitutional Court's first response to a restitution bill was the
October 1990 advisory opinion Compensation Case 1103 holding, inter alia,
that the Constitution's equal protection clause' 0 4 prohibits special interest
transfers unaccompanied by a formal cost-benefit calculation showing why
the transfer is necessary for the public good and superior to a non-discriminatory transfer.' 05 This holding contained elements of two strategies for
combatting special interest transfers. The first strategy was the Court's
employment of a presumption that legislation providing benefits to a particular group, as opposed to addressing a common pool matter, is beyond
the constitutional authority of Parliament on grounds of inequity. The
Court put the burden on Parliament, rather than the opponents of the
legislation (as is effectively the case today in the United States), of showing
that the wealth transfers favor "the total social result," rather than just a
particular group.10 6
This presumption reflects the approach to constitutional law advocated by the fiscal constitutionalists. 10 7 Indeed, Buchanan explicitly calls
for " [lt] he extension of equity norms to public spending, to the distribution
101. The inflation rate in Hungary from February 1992 to February 1993 was 23.3%.
Report of Hungary's Central Statistical Office (copy of official data on file with the
author).
102. One commentator has gone so far as to characterize the "aggregate economic
effect" of this legislation as "a virtual revolution in property rights over land." Comisso,
supra note 85.
103. Judgment of Oct. 4, 1990 (Compensation Case I), Alkotmfinybir6sfig [Constitutional Law Court], No. 21/1990 (X.4) (Hung.) (official translation on file with the
author) [hereinafter Compensation Case 1]. This article refers to this decision as an advisory opinion, because it was issued pursuant to the Court's authority to review bills
upon the request of specified legislative and executive branch officials. For discussion
of the Constitutional Court's jurisdiction, see Klingsberg, supra note 24, at 55-63.
104. Hungarian Constitution, supra note 60, art. 70/A(1).
105. Compensation Case I, supra note 103, § V(b). The Court has consistently held
that no inherent rights exist to restitution or return of pre-Communist property-i.e.,
the property reforms of the Communist era, however unethical, will not be looked
upon as invalid. In the absence of an inherent right to restitution based upon the
resurrection of pre-Communist rights, a legitimate government interest is necessary to
justify these entitlements under the equal protection clause. For analysis of the jurisprudential roots of this reasoning, see Klingsberg, supra note 24; infra note 157. For
analysis of the development of this reasoning by the Court in various decisions after
October 1990, see Ethan Klingsberg, Safeguardingthe Transition, 2 E. EUR. CONsT. REv.
44 (1993). While refusing to retroactively hold nationalization and collectivization
unconstitutional, the Constitutional Court has always noted that property owners (and
their heirs) who lost property in violation of Communist era law could attempt to make
a case in civil court for restitution based upon Communist era law. See Compensation
Case II, supra note 93 (Zlinsky, J., concurring) (discussing Compensation Case I majority
opinion) (English translation on file with the author).
106. Compensation Case I, supra note 103, § V(b).
107. See supra part I.
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of benefits among persons."' 0 8 The Constitutional Court did precisely this
by applying strictly the equal protection clause to Parliament's attempts at
a version of distributional justice.
The second strategy employed by the Constitutional Court for combatting special interest transfers was the implementation of a mechanism
for overcoming the transaction costs that serve to facilitate the power of
special interest groups in legislatures. That mechanism is a public costbenefit analysis of the legislative wealth transfer.' 0 9 Such an analysis serves
to demystify the worthiness of the special interest group's cause and to
facilitate the organization and dissemination of information necessary for
effective majority opposition." 0 The Court's holding mandated that Parliament sponsor such an analysis before any legislative wealth transfer
could become valid law.
B.

Rejection and Retreat

The Court's Compensation CaseIholding went unheeded in Parliament and
in the public debate. The highly emotional and inexperienced Parliament
could not possibly compose or adhere to the cost-benefit analysis mandated by the Court."' Moreover, the peasant and religious special interest groups were relentless. They launched campaigns in the media against
the Court and all others who stood in the way of their sought after wealth
112
transfers.
Months after Compensation Case I, the members of the ruling coalition
in Parliament were still hotly debating precisely how to compensate preCommunist landowners and churches. A contingent of opposition MPs
realized that the bills under debate were all in direct violation of the Constitutional Court's October 1990 decision and decided to put an end to
108. Buchanan, supra note 20, at 24.
109. At a seminar in New York in 1991, Chief Justice Lazslo Solyom reiterated, in
response to a puzzled questioner, that he actually intended the Compensation Case I
opinion to require Parliament to produce a formal "more favorable total social result"
calculation to justify passing a bill that presented a special entitlement to a particular
group. Conversation with Professor Andrew Arato (New York, Spring 1992).
110. See POSNER, supra note 19, at 622 (requiring strict means-end connection in all
equal protection review would require legislation to set forth the statutory benefits to
special interest sponsor and "would reduce the information costs of opposition to special interest legislation").
111. For similar tales of resistance to cost-benefit analysis of regulations prior to promulgation in countries emerging from authoritarianism and a clientelist state-run economy, see Peter Schuck & Robert E. Litan, Regulatory Reform in the Third World. The Case of
Peru, 4YALEJ. ON REG. 51, 66-67 (1986). Schuck and Litan also discuss resistance in the
United States. Id. at 66 n.29.
112. For a survey of media opposition to the Constitutional Court and constitutional
visions contrary to the Smallholders' and Christian Democrats' special interests, as well
as a feeling for the intense emotions that accompanied those Parties' approaches to
their respective bills, see ANDREW ARATO, REVOLUrION, RESTORATION, AND LEGITIMATION: InEOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF THE TRANsmON FROM STATE SOCLAmsM (1993) (copy
on file with the author).
One opposition proposal, which was rejected, was in accordance with the Court's
Compensation Case I holding. That proposal would have provided equal grants to all
citizens.
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the ongoing debates by submitting to the Court in March 1991 the first
petition for pre-enactment review of a bill as provided for in the jurisdiction provisions of the Act on the Constitutional Court. 11 3 The petition
challenged only the proposals to compensate former peasant landowners,
but the ramifications for compensating churches were clear.
In April 1991, the Court responded with the Compensation Case Ildecision.' 14 This opinion purported to evade direct review of the proposals
on ripeness grounds, explaining that a "final" bill did not yet exist, and
that therefore pre-enactment review would be premature.1 1 5 But the
Court did take the occasion "to summarize its theoretical stance... without rendering a decision on the constitutionality of the provisions" currently being debated by the Parliament. 1 6 The ensuing summary offered
the first sign of the Court's retreat from the Compensation Case I opinion.
The Court stated: "[T]he only thing that may be required is that a reasonable cause for any unequal treatment shall be shown, i.e. to show that such
a treatment does not qualify as arbitrary." 1 7 The Compensation CaseIopinion's mandate that Parliament produce a cost-benefit calculation establishing a positive sum gain for the "total social result" had apparently been
replaced by a "reasonableness" standard couched in deferential language
similar to that of post-Lochner U.S. substantive due process case law.
Over the next few months Parliament finally passed laws granting special benefits to pre-Communist landowners and churches. 118 The Court's
subsequent review of these laws in June 1991,"1 9 February 1993,120 and
113. See Klingsberg, supra note 24, at 60-61 (discussing pre-enactment review ofjurisdiction of Court).
114. Compensation Case II, supra note 93.
115. Id. § 11(2). For discussion of the significance of the "finality" requirement for
pre-enactment review, see Klingsberg, supra note 24, at 60-61 (interpreting the Act on
the Constitutional Court's provisions on pre-enactment review and comparing the situa-

tion with the Spanish Constitutional Court's procedure for pre-enactment review).
supra note 93, § 11(2).
116. Compensation Case A1,
117. Id. § III(1).
118. For a review of the parliamentary acts and votes on compensation, see Okolicsanyi, supra note 99, at 49-52.
119. Judgment ofJune 3, 1991 (Compensation Case III), Alkotminybir6sfig [Constitutional Law Court], No. 28/1991 (VI.3) AB (Hung.) (official translation on file with
the author) [hereinafter Compensation Case II1] (deferring to Parliament's justification
for wealth transfers to pre-Communist property owners and refraining from requiring a
cost-benefit analysis in support of that justification). The asserted justification was "to
settle ownership rights." Id. § I. The Court never explained why sufficient certainty of
ownership rights did not emanate from its previous holdings that pre-nationalization
property rights lacked contemporary validity. Compensation Case I, supra note 103,
§ IV(a);Judgment of May 20, 1991 (The Nationalization Case), Alkotminybir6sfig [Constitutional Law Court], No. 27/1991 (V.20) (Hung.) (official translation on file with the
author) [hereinafter The Nationalization Case].
120. Church Property Case, supra note 95 (upholding Church Property Act by deferring

to legislative justification, support for "functionality of society," without cost-benefit
analysis). The Hungarian Court also upheld the Church Property Act on the Hungarian equivalent of establishment clause grounds, an area where the U.S. Court has
been less deferential of late to minority interest group legislation. See infra notes 185-94
and accompanying text.
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March 1993121 refrained from the penetrating Lochner-style scrutiny prom-

ised back in October 1990 and, in effect, upheld special interest wealth
transfers. The Court's decisions rested on deference to the nominal legislative justifications. 122 Although the Court added a caveat, 123 it abandoned the two fundamental strategies for combatting special interest
legislation: the presumption of unconstitutionality and the requirement
of public cost-benefit analysis.
I.

The Rationality of Judicial Deference to Special Interest Politics in
a Transition from State Socialism

Is there a rational explanation for the Court's shift? This question is especially important for countries emerging from state socialism, given the
widely held wisdom, expressed by many prominent political economists
124
from the West, that deference to special interest politics is irrational.
Three factors show why the acceptance of special interest politics and the
wealth transfers that follow is actually in the best interests of Hungary and
the new democracies of Eastern Europe generally.
A.

Legitimacy of Parliament as a Bargaining Forum

Reinforcing the legitimacy of the new parliaments is the most urgent matter on the reform agenda in the fragile East European democracies, in
which voter apathy and feelings of exclusion from the political process
already run high. 125 The Court's deference to legislative wealth transfers
preserves the new Parliament as a forum for bargaining among society's
interest groups. Notwithstanding fiscal constitutionalism's theoretical reservations, the legislature functions as a site for contracts between the state
and interest groups. If the judiciary does not enforce those contracts, the
126
legitimacy of Parliament as a market disappears.
121. Judgment of Mar. 12, 1993 (Compensation Case IV), Alkotmnybir6sig [Constitutional Law Court], No. 15/1993 (111.12) (Hung.) (official translation on file with the
author) [hereinafter CompensationCase ] (reaffirming support for deferential review of
basic concept of wealth transfers).
122. For criticism of both the legislative justifications and the logic of the Court's
acceptance of them, see Klingsberg, supra note 105.
123. See discussion infra part IV.
124. See supra part I. For example, sociologist Andrew Arato's analysis condemns
these Court decisions as doing little more than "saving the influence of... [a] particular
blackmailing minority" and creating a "constitutional crisis." Andrew Arato, Legitimation and Constitution-making in Hungary 12, 14 & n.12, Paper Presented at the American Sociological Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 16, 1993) (copy on file with the
author).
125. See Stephen Holmes, Back to the DrawingBoard,2 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 21 (1993).
126. See William N. Landes & Richard E. Posner, The IndependentJudiciayin an Interest-Group Perspective, 18J.L. & EcoN. 875 (1975); see also Gary S. Becker, A Theoy of CompetitionAmong PressureGroupsfor PoliticalInfluence, 98 Q.J. EcoN. 371 (1983). Just as the
marketplace analogy supports a special interest bargainer's entitlement to the gains for
which it has bargained in the legislative marketplace, the economic theory of "revealed
intensity" can be used to argue that "success by the minority" is compatible ith "democratic theory" (but not "majority rule")-i.e., it is "presumptively desirable" to rewvard
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There is even preliminary evidence that the Hungarian public
endorses the idea of the Parliament as both a forum for special interest
bargaining generally and, in particular, a forum for the Smallholders and
Christian Democrats to cut legitimate deals for themselves.' 2 7 Referendum initiatives 128 to defeat the restitutionary wealth transfers repeatedly
failed to garner support even though polls showed that at least two-thirds
of the population did not personally favor wealth transfers to victims of
nationalization and collectivization. 129 A plausible interpretation of this
evidence is that the public recognized that the Smallholders and Christian
Democrats had made legitimate bargains in Parliament (by supporting the
ruling coalition on a number of issues in exchange for the Church Property and Compensation Acts).1a°
On the other hand, the failure of the referendum initiatives could be
attributed to the aforementioned transaction costs that make it so difficult
for a diffuse majority to organize against a determined special interest
minority. Either way, the Court has signaled to the growing number of
vocal interest groups and minority factions in Hungarian politics that
directing their energies toward striking a bargain in Parliament is potentially more worthwhile than detracting from the new system.
A small number of "radical" Smallholders actually left the ruling coalition in early 1991 rather than endorse the compromise statute that
emerged from legislative bargaining sessions after the Court's October
decision. This Smallholder spin-off group's lack of respect for Parliament
as a bargaining forum was further exhibited by its adoption of ultranationalist, anti-semitic, authoritarian rhetoric. Had the Court invalidated
the bargain obtained by the mainstream Smallholder faction that stuck
with the coalition, the Court would have signalled that the uncompromising spin-off group actually had the correct attitude, since bargaining in
Parliament would not be worthwhile.
While interest group economic theory predicts that certain minority
special interests will obtain disproportional benefits that are not Pareto
optimal, this same economic theory sets forth that these benefits will be
the product of compromise.' 3 ' The mainstream Smallholders may have
benefits to those who are most willing "to expend the political resources necessary to
achieve political success." Elhauge, supra note 21, at 65.
127. Elhauge suggests this possibility with respect to the United States. See Elhauge,
supra note 21, at 66 n.134 (noting possibility that majority "might reject a majoritarian
baseline as the standard for judging laws").
128. Pursuant to the Hungarian Constitution, supra note 60, ch. II, art. 19(5), an
approved referendum, in which more than half of the eligible population votes,
becomes binding law. A referendum can only occur after the collection of 100,000
signatures.
129. See supra note 82.

130. See Klingsberg, supra note 105 (interpreting a Constitutional Court Counselor's
observation that if the Court had not abandoned the principles of Compensation Case I,

"there would have been a revolution").
131. MUELLER, supra note 37, at 236; Matthew L. Spitzer, Antitrust Federalism and
Rational Choice PoliticalEconomy: A Critique of Capture Theoiy, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1293,
1305 (1988). Gary S. Becker's economic analysis of interest group competition goes one
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been a selfish "blackmailing minority," in the words of a commentator who
thinks the Court should have maintained its strong stance;' 3 2 however, the
selfishness of the mainstream Smallholders was checked by a respect for
compromise necessary in pluralistic politics. The Constitutional Court's
deference made way for the victory of compromisers and cooperative bargainers, rather than those with visions incompatible with pluralism.
Catering to interest group politics is especially important for the success of these new democracies in which, since the collapse of Communism,
the public has shown increasing loyalty to smaller factions. In such a scenario, the necessity of building coalitions is both extremely difficult and
always necessary for the existence of a majority.' 3 3 If the Court had struck
down the Compensation Act and the Church Property Act, then not only
would the current parliamentary government have faced a successful noconfidence vote,' 3 4 but also the fractionalized parties' capacity to bargain
with confidence to form stable coalitions in the future would have been
seriously hampered. The difficulty that the inexperienced and emotional
parliamentarians have in forming stable majority coalitions already poses a
major threat to the new democracies' capacity to address the long agenda
of urgent legislative matters facing post-Communist states, as well as to the
public images of these new parliaments in societies unaccustomed to instability.135 In sum, the failure ofjudiciaries to ratify special interest bargains
step further to argue that the bargaining process will produce compromises that tend to
make the special interest group's legislative and regulatory subsidies more efficient.
Becker, supra note 126, at 383-86, 395-96.
132. See Arato, supra note 124 (fiercely criticizing Klingsberg's defense of Court's
compensation decisions).
133. See Klingsberg, supra note 28, at 889 & n.106 (discussing fractionalization of
Polish Solidarity, the Czechoslovakian Public Against Violence, and the Hungarian
Democratic Forum).
134. See Paczolay, supra note 26, at 831 & n.56 (noting that "immediate political consequence" of a decision striking down Compensation Act would have been collapse of
governing coalition).
135. Serious problems with forming stable coalitions have plagued Bulgaria and
Poland, as well as Romania. The Hungarian coalition came closest to collapsing when
the Smallholders threatened to leave the coalition if the ruling coalition adhered to the
Compensation Case Iopinion. See id. (account of Court's retreat from Compensation Case I
opinion written by Chief Counselor of the Constitutional Court) (citing Smallholders'
threats to leave the coalition as support for the statement: "In these cases, the Court
became a direct actor in the interplay of political forces; it cannot ignore the possible
immediate political consequences of its decisions.").
Susan Rose-Ackerman pointed to this potential problem with Buchanan's fiscal constitutionalism 10 years ago when she wrote that Buchanan "ignores the possibility of
continuing government instability" if electoral restraints on wealth transfers are
replaced with constitutional constraints. Susan Rose-Ackerman, A New PoliticalEconomy,
80 MIcH. L. REv.872, 875-78 (critiquingJAMEs M. BucHANAN,THE LiMrrs OF LIBERTY 4950, 77 (1975)); GEOFFREY BRENNAN &JAMEs M. BucHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX: ANALYriCAL FOUNDATIONS OF A FiscAL CONSTrrUTION (1980); see also Elhauge, supra note 21, at
64-65 & nn. 129-130 ("political success by the minority might be regarded as not only

desirable but necessary for the legitimacy of majoritarian rule").
A split within America's conservative law and economics camp also highlights this
problem with judicial enforcement of economic rights. While some follow Buchanan's
admonition that legislative wealth transfers endanger democratic ideals, see supra note
19, others see constitutional restrictions upon legislative wealth transfers as posing a
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struck in the new legislatures could be fatal to the credibility of East European parliaments already beleaguered by disaffected populaces, increasingly fractionalized political forces, inexperience, a burdensome agenda,
and a lack of respect for pluralism.
B. Judicial Capital and the Importance of Human Rights Protection in
a New Democracy
The previous subsection showed how the Constitutional Court's assertion
of checks upon the Parliament would hinder the transition to democracy.
However, this criticism of constitutional court authority should not be
taken too far. The judicial assertion of certain types of restraints upon a
parliament is necessary for a successful transition. The Hungarian Constitutional Court's abandonment of an intrusive Lochnerian approach to
wealth transfers actually served to preserve "judicial capital" for those
other occasions when strong judicial review is beneficial for both the
Court and the transition. To understand fully this "preservation ofjudicial
capital" thesis, it is first necessary to review the current debate over
whether constitutional courts are facilitating or hindering the transitions
36
to democracy in Eastern Europe.'
The argument that active constitutional courts pose threats to democratic transitions in Eastern Europe has been presented most strongly by
political scientist Stephen Holmes. 137 On the other end of the spectrum,
sociologist Andrew Arato harshly criticizes Holmes for "repeating the thesis of right wing authoritarians and radicals." 138 The arguments of both
Holmes and Arato are incomplete. Both their points of view are overly
broad in their respective skepticism of and support for a strong constitutional court. Neither distinguishes between (a) judicial review that delegitimizes parliament as a bargaining forum (i.e., judicial review that takes a
Lochnerian approach to legislative wealth transfers)' 3 9 and (b) judicial
review that checks a parliament from alienating individuals and groups
from the new democratic system and cutting them off from a Western
threat to stable government even in the United States. See Coniston Corp. v. Village of
Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 467 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., joined by Easterbrook,
J.) ("the Constitution does not... outlaw the characteristic operations of democratic
(perhaps of any) government, operations which are permeated by pressure from special
interests"); see also Easterbrook, supra note 34, at 60 (citing respect for power of democratic politics as basis for his refusal to advocate, in his capacity as a professor, judicial
review that suppresses special interest transfers). See generally POSNER, supra note 19, at
617 (describing tension between efficiency concerns and democracy).
136. Constitutional courts exist in Poland, Bulgaria, Albania, Romania, Kazakhstan,
Croatia, Bosnia, and the Czech Republic. In addition, the new Kyrgyzstan Constitution
provides for such a court. After the battles of October 4, 1993 in Moscow, President
Yeltsin dissolved the Russian Constitutional Court, but the new Constitution includes
provisions for a constitutional court. Constitutional courts have also played roles in
transitions to democracy in Spain, Austria, and Germany. For an overview of some of
the new constitutional courts, see Herman Schwartz, The New East European Constitutional Courts, 13 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 741 (1992).
137. Holmes, supra note 125.
138. Arato, supra note 124, at 16, nn.6, 16-18.
139. See supra part III.A.
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European-style civil and political society (i.e.,judicial review that indicates
an exchange of the Communist regime's attitude toward human rights for
the European Covenant's values).140 The latter type of review is necessary
for the new democracies' success, while the former is both harmful to
democratic development, as shown in the previous section, and as this section argues, infringes upon a court's capacity to engage in the latter type
of review.
Professor Arato criticizes departures from strict judicial enforcement
of constitutional norms, including the Hungarian Court's deference in the
restitution decisions, as steps toward "a majoritarian-authoritarian resolution of all major issues of the day."' 4 1 Technically, the Court's retreat in
the compensation cases was deferential to "majoritarianism," because it
enabled the will of the legislature to triumph. However, the Court's deference was not to "authoritarianism," because this was not an instance of a
majority group exclusively benefitting from either the placement of a burden upon a minority faction or the obstruction of a minority faction's participation in civil or political society. Some mechanisms-such as the
constitutional referendum option-permit the will of the majority to triumph over the will of a minority. In contrast, the Court deferred to the
chance for a minority to use all of its bargaining power to strike a deal for
itself in the legislature.1 42 Such bargaining is a sign of flourishing pluralism rather than authoritarianism. 143 Moreover, the Court's validation of
the bargains made in the legislature actually deflects legitimacy away from
those minorities, such as the ultra-nationalist Smallholder spin-off faction,
that would rather receive rents through authoritarian tactics than by compromising and bargaining in-the legislature.'4
Arato and other critics of the Court's retreat have probably deemed
the Court's shift a sign of support for "majoritarian-authoritarianism"
because of their opposition to the substance of the "historical continuity"
140. While some Americans would classify Lochner-era "economic rights" as falling
within the definition of basic human rights, such rights do not fall within the general
category of rights recognized in the European Covenant. Therefore, those rights are
omitted from this latter category. The European Covenant only protects property
rights from unreasonable or arbitrary interference. See First Protocol to the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Mar. 20, 1952, art. 1.
141. Arato, supra note 124, at n.6.
142. If the Court wanted to foster a system where only the will of the majority could
triumph, then it would have employed the aforementioned strategies, see suprapart I, to
facilitate the capacity of the majority to overcome the power of special interests in the
legislature.
143. See Elhauge, supra note 21, at 65 (arguing democratic theory can be in tension
with deference to majority will when a minority is more intensely interested than the
majority) (citing

MARTIN SIIAHIRO, LAw AND

PoLITIcs
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219-20

(1964)).
144. See supra part III.A (explaining how a "radical" authoritarian-leaning faction
within the Smallholders Party left the coalition rather than compromise in Parliament);
see also Easterbrook, supra note 34, at 60 (explaining that if a court denies motivated
interest groups "the outcome they want" after they have compromised and bargained in
the legislature, then "they may find other ways to accomplish their ends, ways that
impose even greater losses on the rest of us").
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rhetoric of the Smallholders and Christian Democrats, rather than
because of the Court's deference to a bargain struck by a minority group
in Parliament. These commentators take offense at the Smallholders'
claim that the peasants of 1945-47 (post-land reform and pre-Communist
era) embodied the true Hungary and at the Christian Democrat reference
to eras of greater church hegemony for inspiration. They argue forcefully
that the post-Communist danger in Eastern Europe is not a resurrection of
Communism but rather the movements inspired by such claims to historical continuity with the "real," usually ethnically homogenous, nationstate. 145 Such historical continuity sentiments could inspire groups to
attempt to use state power to abuse the civil and political rights of groups
viewed as less privileged historically. However, the Hungarian Court has
never indicated that it would defer to political branches if such rhetoric
led to abuses of civil and political rights. The restitution acts, moreover,
were not human rights abuses, but simply special interest transfers. As
Ellen Comisso's insightful political analysis shows:
[T]he main "historical continuity" arising out of the compensation acts
seems to be that of small groups of individuals seeking to use the power of
the state to put them in a position to collect rents from society. One cannot
help but add that such a "historical continuity" is hardly a unique
character146
istic of either Hungary or any other state in Eastern Europe.
The criticism of the failure ofjudicial review to stop "blackmailing minorities" is focused more properly on the potential violations of civil liberties
and human rights that may arise from intolerant lawmakers than on the
innocent activity of special interest bargaining.
While Professor Arato issues overly broad calls for judicial intervention to protect democracy, Professor Holmes dismisses all judicial review
in new East European democracies as necessarily weakening the precarious positions of the new parliaments. Holmes does not appear to recognize that strong judicial protection of European human rights norms and
subsequent conformity to such judicial review by a parliament are necessary to sustain the legitimacy of a post-Communist legislature and the new
democracy generally. 147 Otherwise, the populace will perceive the situation under democracy as no different from the situation under the
rejected prior regime. Moreover, avenues'for individual and group partic145. SeeARATO, supra note 112. For a similar critique of the restitution acts throughout Eastern Europe, see Shlomo Avineri, The New Laws: History Between the Lines, 2 E.
EuR. CONsT. REv. 34, 36 (1993); see also Klingsberg, supra note 83 (discussing Polish
dissident writer Adam Michnik's thesis that ultra-nationalist movements are actually the
final stage of Communism).
146. Comisso, supra note 85, at 27. Although Arato labels the Smallholders "a
blackmailing minority," see supra note 124, his frequent analyses of Hungarian legislation refrain from criticizing a single special interest victory of those factions he favors
(or even the special benefits to Jews and political prisoners provided in companion
statutes to the Compensation Act). Arato's distinction supports Einer Elhauge's thesis
that all arguments for more intrusive judicial review of special interest legislation ultimately have a substantive baseline, rather than a source in a transcendent opposition to
all special interest legislation. Elhauge, supra note 21, at 48-66.
147. Klingsberg, supra note 24, at 133.
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ipation in civil and political activities critical to the democratic process will
be at risk without active judicial review.1 48 The failure of a new East European constitutional court to enforce European human rights actively
would engender public apathy towards democracy and acceptance of the
next wave of authoritarianism as simply more of the same.
Chief Justice Solyom deserves enormous credit-from a transition
strategy, as well as from a natural rights perspective-for his commitment
to making the Constitutional Court a leading agent for the implementation in Hungary of European human rights standards, many of which he
149
claims to find in an "invisible constitution" of human dignity principles.
The Court has rectified such violations as: the centralized collection of
data about citizens' private lives, the absence of administrative courts, retroactive criminal prosecutions, capital punishment, and non-consensual
union representation. This Court's frequent checks on Parliament protect
the legitimacy of the new legislature and democratic system.
Unfortunately, the crucial role of European human rights guardian is
quite burdensome for an infant constitutional court in Eastern Europe, as

the Hungarian Constitutional Court's predicament reveals. Several factors
underlie this burdensome predicament. The reformers of Hungary's
Communist Constitution were eager to impress the world and the domestic population that the transition was genuine, so they created a judicial
review organ with vast formal power: pre-enactment, post-enactment, and
advisory opinion review-compounded by loose justiciability standards. 150
It is the country's only organ with the power of constitutional review, and
local governments provide only a weak alternative check on the national
government. 1 5 ' Furthermore, laws, regulations, official behavior patterns,
and institutions leftover from the prior regime and arising under the cur15 2
rent regime are frequently in violation of fundamental human rights.
As a result of these circumstances, the young Hungarian Court courageously issues dozens of declarations of unconstitutionality every yearquite a difference from the United States Supreme Court's prudent exercise of judicial review only once in its first sixty-seven years.' 53
The consequence of the Hungarian Court's tremendous caseload and
frequent historic human rights decisions is a significant degree of public
148. See generallyJoHN ELY, DFmocRAcY AND DISTRusr: A THEORY OFJUDICIAL REVIEW

(1981).
149. For discussion of the development of this "invisible constitution" idea in Hungarian case law, see Klingsberg, supra note 24, at 78-81.
150. For discussion of the jurisdiction of the Court as derived from the Act on the
Constitutional Court, the Constitution, and case law, see id. at 53-80.

151. Id.
152. Id. at 64-66 (discussing post-Communist phenomenon of widespread unconstitutionality). In fact, more violations of human rights seem to be arising under new laws
than from old laws. SeeAndras Sajo, Constitutionalism in Hungary, Paper Presented at
Oxford University (June 1993) (text on file with the author).
153. The United States Supreme Court first set forth the principle ofjudicial review
in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), and then did not reassert this prerogative
until it struck down an act of Congress in 1857 in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393

(1856).
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criticism. Liberals are upset with the poor quality of the Court's legal reasoning,' 5 4 which stems from a combination of overwork and inexperience.
Occasionally, parliamentarians rally against the Court for stealing their
spotlight in leading the transition. Most significantly, these courageous
human rights decisions, even if they are generally popular and accepted,
earn the Court an increasingly angry pool of enemies in the political
arena, particularly in the ultra-nationalist factions within the ruling
coalition.
Amid this background,. the vicious criticism of the Court's October
1990 Lochnerian opinion on restitution was especially intimidating and
endangered the Court's more pressing mission of protecting European
human rights. Those seeking the wealth transfers actually proposed statutory limitations and even abolition of the Court. During this period, Chief
Justice Solyom and the other justices wisely became aware that the Court
would only be able to play its far more important role as European human
rights guardian if it used its capital wisely. 155 The results of the Court's
retreat from Lochnerian opposition to interest group bargaining and legislative wealth transfers were: the failure of the calls for the abolition and
limitation of the authority of the Constitutional Court, and, most importantly, the continuation of the Court's activism on the European human
rights front.
These results conform to the preliminary political economic evidence
that legislatures tend to reward courts with greater independence and
powers of review when those courts function effectively as guardians of
legislative wealth transfers.' 56 In sum, if Chief Justice Solyom wanted to
154. See, e.g., Sajo, supra note 152. The legal reasoning also suffers from the Court's
puzzling reluctance to utilize fully an adversarial oral and written argument process.
155. The use of the metaphor of "judicial capital" to assess the limits upon judicial
review was first used by Alexander Hamilton. THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 278 (Alexander Hamilton) (Charles A. Beard ed., 1959) (doubting whether the judiciary "would
possess the degree of credit and authority" to exercise judicial review in certain circumstances). ProfessorJesse Choper has written at length on the "phenomenon of exhaustible capital"?
At some point-the exact location of which is unknown, but the existence in
fact virtually undisputed-the Court's continued antimajoritarian rulings will
tip the balance of credit accumulation and expenditures and animate a public
sentiment that it has but a gossamer claim to legitimacy in a democratic society,
thus either inducing popular disregard of the Court's decisions or inspiring
political forces to seek to bring it to heel, or both.
JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDIcIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL PoLrmICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 139-40 (1980); see also
Robert McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and

Reburia4 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 34, 54, 60-61 (arguing that even though post-Lochnerprinciples are "inadequate," concerns for "judicial economy" lead to a "calculus" that dictates
against bringing back economic due process).
In a frank account of the Court's decision to retreat from Compensation Case I, the
Chief Counselor from the Court comments: "The Court hardly can remain untouched
by the pressure weighed on it by both the press and public opinion." Paczolay, supra
note 26, at 831.
156. Gary M. Anderson et al., On the Incentives ofJudges to Enforce Legislative Wealth
Transfers, 32 J.L. & ECON. 215 (1989) (comparing relationships between various state
courts and state legislators); cf.John R. Schmidhauser et al., The Impact ofJudicialDeci-
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have his "invisible constitution" of European human rights norms, then he
had to let parliamentarians play their wealth transfer games. The Court's
decision to act upon this realization was not only in the best interests of
judicial review, but also ultimately in the best interests of a successful transition to democracy.
C.

Legislative Wealth Transfers as the Key to Economic Transition

The fiscal constitutionalistI 57 admonition that legislatures should address
only common pool problems and refrain from wealth transfers and other
interferences in private markets has limited applicability to wealth transfers in the setting of a transition from Communism. Interference with
private markets in the form of legislative wealth transfers (i.e., privatization of state resources) is necessary if private markets are to thrive in Eastern Europe. "Privatization" encompasses the legislative authorization of
transfers to the private sector of the state's near-monopoly on rights in
158
land, businesses, and personal property, as well as investment capital.
Indeed, the wealth transfers at issue in the Compensation Acts were distributed in the form of "privatization coupons," which enabled beneficiaries to attain rights in state properties being privatized and in turn to
facilitate the rise of private sector entrepreneurs in a capital drained
a59
society.
sions: New Dimensions in Supreme Court-CongressionalRelations 1945-1968, 1971 WASH. U.
L.Q. 209, 238 (concluding that partisan considerations rather than "reverence" influence Congressional voting patterns on proposals affecting the Supreme Court).
Elhauge argues that in the United States "there is little connection between judicial
decisions and legislative action on judicial pay and jurisdiction." Elhauge, supra note
21, at 86. He cites the large number ofjudges and the consequent difficulty of punishing certain judges without harming the other deferential judges, as well as the unlikelihood that a particular judge will provoke the legislature's reaction. Id. These factors
do not apply to the Hungarian scenario, however, where there is only one court engaging in judicial review.
157. See supra part I.
158. Article 10(2) of the Hungarian Constitution deems the use of all State property
to be subject to the discretion of the lawmakers. Hungarian Constitution, supra note
60, ch. II, art. 10(2). Thus, the "restitution" of property to the pre-Communist owners
is entirely subject to the discretion of the legislatures. See, e.g., Compensation CaseI,supra
note 103; Compensation Case HI,supra note 93.
159. The Compensation Act "constitutes a flow of capital to private individuals who
had nothing before. As such, it helps strengthen Hungary's private sector ....[I]n one
sense privatization is only a bookkeeping exercise involving a financial transfer, on
paper, from state to private ownership." Okolicsanyi, supra note 89, at 52. In particular
the distribution of compensation vouchers has caused a significant increase in the
number of privately owned apartments. Moreover, the transferability of the compensation vouchers has resulted in "additional capital [being] available to Hungary's leading
entrepreneurs in the form of compensation bonds bought for significantly less than
their face value and then used to finance privatization deals." Id. Despite the temporary administrative confusion, the Compensation Act will enable agriculture to operate
on the basis of (cooperative and private) property rights separate from the state.
The Church Property Act has had a less significant impact on privatization. The
Church Property Act has enabled private organizations superficially to remove state
responsibility for running numerous hospitals, educational facilities, and other institutions; however, the reality of the situation is that the "state provides the same amount of
aid per student or patient to Church hospitals and schools as it does to their state
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Hypothetically, wealth transfers from the post-Communist state to private sectors could have taken place in accordance with the Compensation
Case I opinion's strict requirements of equal treatment and cost-benefit
analyses. The transfers that would have taken place under those circumstances would have been ideal, because they would assure a degree of
equity of resource distribution necessary for a thriving modem civil society.160 As stated above, however, this type of ideal conduct by post-Communist legislators is highly unlikely. 16 1 Emotional interest group politics
seem to be higher on the agenda. Amid this background, a decision by
the Court to adhere to Compensation Case T's strict standards would have
not only blocked sub-optimal special interest transfers, but also had the
much more severe consequence of stunting the transition from state domination of resources.
The initial post-Communist wealth transfers, which are all arguably in
pursuit of privatization, may even be partially justifiable under Buchanan's
fiscal constitutionalist theory.162 The target of Buchanan's critiques are
traditional "fiscal exchanges" in which "income is to be transferred from
one set of persons to another." 6 3 As most individuals during these early
years of post-Communism refrain from paying taxes as a result of either
evasion or a near poverty level income, these transition-era transfers are
more accurately characterized as transfers from the state to individuals
rather than from one private person's income to another private person's
pocket. While much of the anti-"distributionaljustice" critique still applies
to these special interest grants-especially the problems of rent-seeking
and ultimate inequity' 6 4-such transfers are distinguishable from the typical "fiscal exchange" on the grounds of what Buchanan calls "utility interdependence;" 165 the non-beneficiaries receive an indirect and important
counterparts." Oltay, supra note 82, at 55. In addition, church ownership often
removes buildings from market influences in a way similar to nationalization. Nevertheless, as the churches become more desperate for finances, they may begin to put many
of their new properties to rational economic uses.
160. Klingsberg, supra note 28, at 895-901 (advocating constitutional review of privatization and other aspects of the transition (from state to private sector) to assure equal
treatment and protect against sub-optimal domination of the transition by well-organized special interest groups like the Smallholders).
Distribution of privatization vouchers to all citizens was an attempt to add a degree of
equity to the privatization processes in other Eastern European countries. These vouchers enabled all citizens to purchase shares in state property. However, even in these
countries, certain privileged groups have still been able to dominate privatization due
to: (a) control by select groups of mutual funds that purchase the vouchers at a low
rate; and (b) the privatization of a great deal of state property by means other than
vouchers, including legislative wealth transfers and exchanges of state property for capital other than vouchers.
161. See supra text accompanying note 111.
162. See generally supra part I.
163. Buchanan, supra note 20, at 25.
164. See part I (on rent-seeking and related problems). For a discussion of how
efforts at unconstrained distributional justice, ultimately foster highly inequitable
results for many of those who are initially worst off, see BRENNAN & BucHANAN, supra
note 2, at 112-33.
165. Buchanan, supra note 20, at 25.
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benefit from the transfer to the special interest. Interest transfers are suboptimal and inequitable, but the creation of a viable free market benefits
even those outside the targeted special interests. Perhaps the "lesser of
two evils" is the most appropriate way to describe why these transition-era
transfers are superior to a more strict approach that stunts progress
altogether.
IV. A Variation on the Retreat from Lochners Approach to InterestGroup Politics
The Hungarian Constitutional Court may deserve credit not only for
wisely retreating from the Lochnerian rigidity of Compensation Case I so that
the transition to democracy and the crucial transfer of state resources to
private sectors could progress,' 66 but also for modeling its retreat in a way
that minimizes the potential for sub-optimal domination of the transition
by select, well-organized special interest groups.' 67 A closer look at the
Court's retreat from Compensation Case I is necessary to understand how
the Court may have enabled the transition to progress, while inserting a
degree of equality into the transfer process.
A.

Deference to Justification, But Strict Review of Means

The Court now approves legislative wealth transfers based upon justifications-the pursuit of "settle[ment of] ownership rights"' 68 (Compensation
Act) and "functionality [of society]" 169 (Church Property Act)-that are
facially weak 170 and unsupported by any analysis showing benefits for what
the Compensation Case I opinion termed the "total social result." However,
the Court's deference is not complete. The Court conditions approval on
Parliament treating all similarly situated groups equally. If Parliament is to
get away with these vague legislative justifications, then similar transfers
must be provided to all other groups to whom those justifications apply.
In other words, differential treatment in comparison with the general population is now constitutionally permissible; however, differential treatment
in comparison with those situated similarly to the select beneficiaries is
proscribed. Such an interpretation of the equal protection clause does
not halt wealth transfers; it only requires the broadening of the pool of
17 1
beneficiaries.
166.
167.
168.
169.

See supra parts III.A-III.C.
See supra part I (on the sub-optimality of special interest wealth transfers).
Compensation Case III,supra note 119, § I.
Church Property Case, supra note 95, § III.

170. For more detailed explanations of the genealogy of thosejustifications and their
weaknesses, see Klingsberg, supranote 105.
171. The source of this approach is probably Ronald Dworkin's analysis of affirmative action, with which the ChiefJustice is perhaps as taken as he apparently once was
with Epstein's commentary on the takings clause. SOLYOM, supra note 66, at 47 (citing
influence of Dworkin's theory of equality). Dworkin sets forth a deferential standard
for reviewing the objective of legislative action that benefits a special interest: the law
must be in pursuit of "some acceptable convention of how people are treated as
equals." RONALD DWORMIN, LAw's EMPIRE 397 (1986). Dworkin then sets forth a second
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Thus, the Court approved the Compensation Act's wealth transfers to
victims of Communist era land confiscations on the condition that Jewish
victims of World War II era takings, ethnic German victims of post-World
War II era takings, and victims of Communist era personalproperty confiscations receive compensation on a scale equal to the compensation provided the peasant victims of real estate collectivization.' 7 2 Similarly, the
Court upheld the transfer of state resources to church victims of nationalization on the condition that Parliament provide entitlements to all "public
purpose organizations," including secular groups (unions, political parties) and those religious groups that lost no property to the
73
Communists.'
This aspect of the Hungarian Constitutional Court's approach to legislative wealth transfers constitutes a significant aberration from the
United States Supreme Court's retreat from Lochner. While both the Hungarian and U.S. Courts now recognize the legitimacy of virtually any legislative justification for a special interest wealth transfer, the Hungarian
Court has decided to treat the overinclusiveness of a justification more
seriously than the U.S. Court. The U.S. Court will uphold a special interest wealth transfer supported by an overinclusive justification on the
grounds that the legislature is proceeding "one step at a time" and will
eventually provide appropriate benefits to all parties to whom the justification applies.' 74 By contrast, the Hungarian Court approves the law in
question on the condition that the legislature provide benefits, equal to
those provided in the law under review, to all similarly situated parties. In
the Compensation.Case HI decision, the Court even conditioned upholding
the Compensation Act upon the legislature's compliance with a deadline
for the enactment of equivalent benefit packages for the similarly situated
parties not included or treated equally in the original Compensation
17 5
Act.
There is potential for the Hungarian Court to interpret loosely the
requirement of "equal benefits" for similarly situated groups and thereby
move closer to the current U.S. system. The Hungarian Court has set
"general" requirement, which is apparently the source of the Court's requirement that
the legislature must also provide benefits to all similarly situated groups who fall within
the legislative objective: "Government violates this more general requirement whenever it ignores the welfare of some group in its calculation of what makes the community as a whole better off." Id.
172. See Compensation Case II, supra note 119; Compensation Case IV, supra note 121.
173. Church Property Case, supra note 95, § III.
174. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970) (upholding underinclusive welfare plan); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489
(1955) (denying equal protection challenge to legislative justification on grounds that
legislature will pass laws "one step at a time" to address all parties that fall within legislative justification).
175. Compensation Case III, supra note 119, § I(d) (2). A special provision in the
Court's jurisdictional statute provides for prospective declarations of unconstitutionality
in the event Parliament does not engage in a specific act by a deadline set by the Court.
See Klingsberg, supra note 24, at 64-66 (analyzing Article 43 of the Act on the Constitutional Court).
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forth that similarly situated groups can receive differential treatment
based upon a legitimate legislative justification, and the Court may well
turn out to be deferential when reviewing such justifications. However, as
recently as March 1993, the Court struck down portions of the Compensation Act for treating the former owners of land better than the former
owners of personal property. 176 Perhaps what will develop is a two-tiered
level of review of legislative justifications. The deferential level would
apply to review of the general justification for providing the original special interest benefit. 177 The strict level would apply to review of why the
legislature is not providing equal benefits to all those other groups for
whom the originally asserted and upheld general justification would apply.
B.

An Equal Treatment Clause: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?

The Hungarian Court's adoption of this approach to equal protection
scrutiny of wealth transfers, which Chief Justice Solyom calls the prohibition against "discrimination within the same regulatory concept,"' 7 8 puts
the Court in a position of mandating widespread positive rights. The
Court's enforcement of the principle of "equal benefits for all similarly
situated groups" could result in numerous orders to the Parliament to create entitlements on behalf of omitted classes. Such a development reflects
the "positive rights" orientation of the Hungarian equal protection
clause's text: "The Republic of Hungary shall ensure human and civil
rights for everyone within its territory without discrimination of any
kind." 179 In effect, the Hungarian Constitution sets forth an equal treatment clause, mandating affirmative state action to "ensure" the provision of
180
a panoply of "human and civil rights for everyone."
By contrast, the U.S. Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment prohibition against a state decision to "deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws" is phrased in terms oriented towards
prohibiting the state from selectively refraining from providing the "protection" of the laws (to enforce a contract or protect a property right) that
are invoked by the individual. Consistent with this reading, the U.S.
Supreme Court's interpretations of the equal protection clause generally
176. Compensation Case IV, supra note 121 (striking down, on equal protection
grounds, the extra state subsidies for those former landowners trying to attain pre-Communist possessions). The regulations implementing the Compensation Act can be
found in Government Decree 104/1991 (Aug. 3, 1991) (copy on file with the author).
177. In Compensation Case III, supra note 119, § I(b), the very opinion in which the
Court set forth this requirement of a legitimate justification for failing to extend benefits to similarly situated groups (i.e., the Jews, ethnic Germans, and former personal
property owners), the Court indicated that it was not going to review strictly the legislature's general justification for providing the initial special interest transfers to former
landowners.
178. SOLYOM, supra note 66.
179. Hungarian Constitution, supra note 60, ch. XII, art. 70/A.
180. Id. See RoNALD DwoRuaN, TAKING Riarrrs SERIOUSLY 227 (1978) (defining "equal
treatment" as "the right to an equal distribution of some opportunity or resource or
burden"). In the European context, "human rights" encompasses certain positive social
rights.
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refrain from adopting a position like that of the Hungarian Court and
adhere to the American tradition against finding constitutional sources for
positive rights. 181
During eras when the central function of the state in civil society was
as protector of property and enforcer of contracts, it made sense for the
U.S. judiciary to refrain from interpreting the equal protection clause as
containing a constitutional mandate for the equitable legislative provision
of positive social entitlements. However, positive social rights have
become a primary source of civil rights in post-LochnerAmerica.18 2 Since
the post-LochnerU.S. judiciary has permitted the unlimited growth of the
welfare state and the consequent increase in importance of governmentcreated rights in society, it is no surprise that some keen commentators
have considered ways for U.S. courts to update their equal protection
review to a mode pertinent to this era of positive social rights. 183 Other181. In the United States, positive social rights have sources only in statutes and regulations adopted at the discretion of the state, rather than a mandate in the text of the
Constitution. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). See generally David P.
Currie, Positive and Negative ConstitutionalRights, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 864 (1986).
Lawrence Tribe interprets a few U.S. Supreme Court cases as embodying nondeferential equal protection review of welfare distribution pursuant to a constitutional
requirement of "evenhanded" distribution of welfare benefits by the state. See LAw.
RENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL Law § 16-50 (2d ed. 1988). But see Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) ("Constitution does not empower the
Court to second-guess state officials charged with the difficult responsibility of allocating limited public welfare funds among the myriad of potential recipients"); Gunther,
supra note 19, at 13-14 (discussing U.S. Supreme Court's consistent refusal to subject
allocation of welfare benefits to strict equal protection scrutiny).
182. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Property and Need: The Welfare State and Theories of DistributiveJustice 28 STAN. L. REv. 877 (1976); Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ.
733 (1964).
183. Indeed, 20 years ago Gerald Gunther set forth a proposal for "modestly
interventionist" equal protection review by the U.S. Supreme Court, which is similar to
the approach adopted by the Hungarian Court. Gunther, supra note 19, at 30-48. Gunther argued that the U.S. Court should continue to defer to legislative justifications, but
should "half-way" revert to the Lochner era by applying stricter equal protection review
to the means pursued to achieve the asserted purposes-even when the subject matter
is economic rights. Gunther pointed out that his proposal should appeal to conservatives, who seek to limit inequitable state interference with private economic transactions, and to liberals, who seek more evenhanded distribution of "new property" rights.
Id. In support of his proposal he cited an often overlooked excerpt from a Justice
Jackson concurrence: "Invocation of the equal protection clause.., does not disable
any governmental body from dealing with the subject at hand. It merely means that the
...
[state action] must have a broader impact." Id. (quoting Railway Express Agency,
Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111-13 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
Jonathan Macey offers another related approach for checking special interest transfers without reverting to the Lochner era. See Macey, supra note 44. He argues that
courts should accept the "public regarding" justification of special interest statutes at
face value, thereby leading to statutory interpretations that broaden the legislation's
effects. Macey's proposal for checking special interest legislation is similar to the Hungarian Court's strategy in that it attempts to convert deference to the legislativejustification into a means for broadening the narrow benefits of special interest transfers.
Macey characterizes his approach as one of restraint, because it relies on statutory interpretation rather than constitutional review. Macey is actually quite activist, however, in
that he requires courts to rewrite, on their own, special interest legislation in order to
make the outcomes more equitable, while the Hungarian Court's constitutional check
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wise, the equal protection clause-except for a handful of situations
involving suspect classifications in the distribution of largess-is outdated
in its focus on "protection" rather than "treatment," and the legislature
can serve as the source of significant inequities when distributing benefits.
One of the proposals for modification of U.S. equal protection review
even bears a striking similarity to the path chosen by the Hungarian Con184
stitutional Court.
Moreover, the current U.S. Supreme Court has lately shown an inclination toward Hungarian Constitutional Court style equal treatment,
although pursuant to constitutional provisions other than the equal protection clause. One of the most talked about U.S. Suprem6 Court decisions reviewing special interest legislation in 1994 rejected the usual
deference to the principle that the legislature is proceeding with the evenhanded distribution of benefits "one step at a time," 18 5 in favor of an
approach remarkably similar to that adopted sixteen months earlier in the
Hungarian Constitutional Court's review of statutory benefits to pre-Communist churches in the ChurchPropenr Caseopinion.' 8 6 At issue before the
U.S. Court in Board of Education of Kiyas Joel Village School District v.
Grumet'8 7 was a New York law providing benefits to an enclave of Satmar
Hasidim. The challenged statute appeared to be a classic example of
"[un] evenhanded distribution" 8 8 stemming from successful legislative bargaining by a tightly knit minority community.' 8 9 Mirroring the Hungarian
Court's equal protection analysis in The Church Property Case and the other
relies on the popularly approved Constitution and mandates that the legislature undertake the broadening of the laWs.
The Hungarian Constitutional Court's approach to wealth transfers does not eliminate all inequities, as seen from the fiscal constitutionalist perspective, because wealth
transfers are still taking place-the only difference is that now the pool of special interest beneficiaries is wider. For a fiscal constitutionalist such an outcome is still inequitable. See infra note 197.
184. See discussion of Gunther, supra note 183.
185. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
186. See supra notes 118-23, 168-77 and accompanying text.
187. 62 U.S.L.W. 4665 (U.S. June 28, 1994).
188. Id. at 4672.
189. Id. at 4666, 4669 (describing "special" enactment by legislature in favor of community of approximately 8,500 persons); Id. at 4677 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (statute
benefitted "tiny minority sect").
As Richard Epstein has pointed out to me, the special interest legislation at issue in
KiiyasJoel is arguably more difficult for an opponent of special interests to condemn
than other products of special interest bargaining. The Satmar Hasidim sought a special interest statute (creating a special school district for educating their handicapped
children), as opposed to settling for the same education subsidy for handicapped children that all other New Yorkers may receive, because, under the Supreme Court's
recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the only way the Satmar enclave could take
advantage of the usual public education subsidy for handicapped children was through
the enactment of a special school district for them. From this viewpoint, the Satmars
did not seek anything that NewYork was not giving away to others, the Satmarsjust had
to bargain for more in order to overcome the obstacles of recent Establishment Clause
case law. In other words, disagreement with recent Establishment Clause case law may
make it logical to depart from or at least less easy to justify the usual claims against
special interest legislation when analyzing KiryasJoeL
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more recent restitution cases,' 90 five U.S. Supreme CourtJustices in Kiryas
Joel accepted implicitly the general justification for the statute (meeting
the education needs of handicapped children) and then went on to scrutinize the statute rather carefully in light of the constitutional "concern [for]
whether the benefit received by the Satmar community is one that the
legislature will provide equally to other religious (and nonreligious)
groups." 19 ' When faced with such a concern, the Hungarian Court in The
ChurchProperty Caseand other recent restitution cases has either set a deadline for the legislature to pass additional legislation to cover overlooked
similarly situated groups that have been brought to the Court's attention
or, in the event no such groups have been brought to the Court's attention, permitted the statute to stand subject to future challenges identifying
overlooked similarly situated groups. 19 2 But the U.S. Court lacks the institutional flexibility to declare an enactment prospectively unconstitutional
and is therefore left with only a choice between either striking down the
special interest legislation as inequitable, as the Court did in the KiryasJoel
case, or adhering to the usual "one step at a time" view under which a
court refrains from "presum[ing] that the [legislature] would not grant the
same accommodation in a similar future case." 193 Given the institutional
limitations of the U.S. judiciary, the broad application of the Kiryas Joel
opinion's Hungarian style equal treatment stance would lead to the striking down of legislative wealth transfers with neo-Lochnerian abandon.
Accordingly, the decision will be limited in precedential scope to cases
where the special interest beneficiary has religious contours. Other recent
decisions, however, indicate that a majority of the Court may be taking a
94
similar turn in cases that fall within the ambit of the Commerce Clause.'
Interest in a modified interpretation of the equal protection clause itself
could be on the horizon. If at some point in the future the U.S. Supreme
Court moves closer toward expansion of this constitutional concern for
the evenhanded distribution of special interests to similarly situated
groups, it may be useful to consider modifying equity jurisdiction and conceptions of separation of powers in order to permit the issuance of declarations of prospective unconstitutionality and deadlines for the legislature
to add a similarly situated group to a benefit plan. The results of the Hungarian Court's attempt to implement its tempered acceptance of special
interest transfers could provide significant data for both U.S. Supreme
Court Justices and commentators contemplating new directions for U.S.
equal protection jurisprudence.
C.

Defusing the Sub-Optimality of Special Interest Transfers

In the best case scenario, the Hungarian Court's modified retreat from
190. See supra notes 118-23, 168-77 and accompanying text.

191. KiyasJoel 62 U.S.L.W. at 4669; Id. at 4673 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
192. See supra notes 118-23, 168-77 and accompanying text.
193. KiryasJoel 62 U.S.L.W. at 4676 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

194. See supra note 18.
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Lochnerwill diffuse the sub-optimality of special interest transfers1 95 in two
ways. First, the Court's approach will increase the burden upon interest
groups seeking wealth transfers from the legislature. Wealth transfer proposals will now carry with them the requirement of providing benefits not
only to the well-organized interest group at the bargaining table, but also
to a contingent of similarly situated free riders. This increase in the cost
of any single transfer scheme may serve to decrease the sum total cost of
transfers in the long run. As interest group theory points out, one of the
reasons transfers to small factions are so easily enacted is that each transfer
usually only entails a small cost. 19 6 The rent-seeking interest group's new
burden will cause the legislature to be more circumspect about underwriting special interest transfers.
The second way the Court's strategy will potentially diffuse the suboptimality of special interest transfers is by assuring that transfers reach a
wider portion of the population than just the most well-organized interest
groups. As the majority's burden benefits a greater number, the gains
from the wealth transfer may increase to such a degree that the proportional costs to the majority (and the wealth transfer's sub-optimality)
decrease.
Under this best case scenario, the Court's modified retreat from Lochner will insert a dose of equality into the transition that is necessary to
prevent a particular interest group from "stealing the revolution" and
bringing back clientelism. Meanwhile, the Court will avoid placing a
direct and rigid Lochnerian check on special interest transfers and therefore will be unlikely to trigger the three dangers described in part III
(delegitimation of Parliament as a bargaining forum, causing a serious
backlash against the Court's capacity to enforce basic human rights, and
inhibition of the post-Communist transfer of state resources to the private
sector).
On the other hand, the Hungarian Court's path may lead to insurmountable administrative costs and require interference with the legislature to a degree that brings about the part III dangers listed above. And if
those obstacles do not hinder the Court from implementing its stated
strategy, then the Court could end up simply compounding the suboptimality of interest group politics by substantially increasing the cost of
special interest transfers, while still neglecting to assure that the aim of
legislation is to benefit the "total social good." 19 7 For better or worse, the
results are sure to be instructive.
195. For explanations of the sub-optimality of special interest transfers by the legislature, see part 1.
196. MCCORMUCK & ToLLISON, supra note 6, at 127.
197. See BucHANAN & TuLLocK, supra note 20, at 293-94 (criticizing attempt to
address needs of all minority special interests as opening "a veritable Pandora's box,"
because "excessive costs will be imposed on the whole population").
However, as post-Communist societies and Hungary in particular become increasingly factionalized, the idea of a law that serves the "total social good" seems increasingly mythical and interest group politics appear more natural.
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Conclusion
For now at least, the Hungarian Constitutional Court has handled the
issue of special interest wealth transfers, raised by restitution legislation, in
a manner that permits: (1) Parliament to continue to function as a legitimate bargaining forum; (2) the Court to continue to function as a strong
guardian of European human rights standards in many instances; and (3)
the transfer of resources to the private sector to continue in a manner with
at least some respect for equity and optimality. Each of these three factors
is essential to the success of democracy. The first result is particularly
important as members of East European societies confront the challenge
of seeing themselves as members of groups that can bargain with each
other, as opposed to atomized masses ready to be mobilized by an uncompromising demagogue. Interest group bargains look bad when they are
contrasted with the public good,' 9 8 but they look good when contrasted
(more realistically) with the uncivil identity politics that plague post-Communist democracies.
This analysis of the path taken by the Hungarian Constitutional Court
shows how a number of contextual factors render traditional and highly
praised political economic axioms about the optimal constitutional
approach to interest group wealth transfers misguided. Moreover, the
Hungarian Court has diverged slightly from the United States Supreme
Court's path away from Lochner in a manner that may well be significantly
more optimal. This analysis should be valuable not only for a better
understanding of how to conduct a successful transition to democracy-a
topic of increasing importance in post-Communist Europe and many
other locales across the globe-but also for those political economists who
have been quick to make universal pronouncements without sufficient reference to context. As democracy spreads, such re-evaluation of what
American experts once thought to be universally applicable counsel will
become increasingly important.

198. Stephen Holmes has pointed out to me that this prejudice in favor of the public

good and against bargains is a legacy of Communist era thinking. See also supra note 26
and accompanying text (discussing influence of Communist era thought on equal protection analysis).

